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USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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2 October 1984

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ERRATUM: In JPRS-UPS-84-075 of 30 August 1984 on p 130 in article UZBEK ECONOMIST ON EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS, RIVER DIVERSION please change the last line of para 2 to read: "In the present demographic situation what is especially necessary is an in-depth solution to the problems of population employment and improvement in the working conditions and the workers' living standard."

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INTERNATIONAL

EDITORIAL HITS U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD NICARAGUA

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 84 pp 6-8

/Text/ The revolution in Nicaragua has opened a new stage in the struggle for the liberation of the blazing continent.

The LATINSKAYA AMERIKA journal time and again has turned to an ideological and political illumination of these problems, revealing the general and particular, the international and national in the revolutionary process in Nicaragua, which is of great importance for all Latin America.

The aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism has had an especially severe effect on the social and economic situation and on the quality of life of Central American nations. All this has intensified the mass support for the Sandinista National Liberation Front on the part of the most diverse strata of Nicaraguan society. This, in turn, has determined the fundamental differences of the revolution in Nicaragua from other versions of independent development, when the policy of limited anti-imperialist measures conducted from "above" within the framework of former government institutions passes as a genuine path of ensuring national sovereignty. The importance of what is going on in Nicaragua lies in the fact that in its potentials the country's development is determined not so much by the program aims of the Sandinista Government as by the level of revolutionary consciousness of the masses, their resolution not to yield to the threats and imperial dictates of the United States and their readiness to refute the "planter" logic of the present bosses of the White House. This explains the enormous ideological and political effect exerted by the Nicaraguan revolution on the advance of the national liberation movement in the region, giving a totally new example of independent development.

Hence the special aggressiveness of U.S. imperialism toward the people of Nicaragua. The formation of free Nicaragua coincided in time with the accession to power in the White House of forces taking the position of so-called political realism, which is to ensure U.S. supremacy by forcing international tension in various regions of the world, including Central America. The provocation of local international conflicts serves for the Reagan Administration as a means of pressure on the foreign political course of countries, whose people fight for their freedom and independence. It is also supposed to form a system of arguments and a verbal decor for a direct intervention by force in the affairs of sovereign states not wishing to submit to Washington's political will. Citing the "permissible" use of force for the intervention against Grenada as an example, Reagan made it clear that the United States also intended to act in the same spirit in the future.

Within the framework of this policy the U.S. administration essentially is waging an undeclared war against the people of Nicaragua. In Central America an anti-Nicaraguan front is thrown together from reactionary regimes obedient to Washington, American military presence is built up and support points for the performance of interventionist actions are established. Honduras has been transformed into an advanced base of aggression. The construction of runways, command posts and other military facilities is carried out in an accelerated manner. Dozens of combat ships of U.S. naval forces have been moved up to the shores of Central American states.

Gangs of hirelings undergo training, are equipped and taught terrorist acts under the guidance of American instructors. Official representatives of the American administration openly credit themselves with the fact that they have organized, trained and equipped Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries. The subversive actions against Nicaragua assume an ever greater scale. Terror and violence by hirelings are more and more brutal. Peaceful settlements are subjected to bombings, the coast is fired at from the sea and attacks are made against vitally important economic facilities. The foreign and internal counter-revolution tries to disorganize the country's normal life. Even more provocative actions began to be undertaken in April 1984. Through the mining of the approaches to Nicaraguan ports, freedom of navigation off the coast of this country was violated.

Washington accompanies the "demonstration of muscles" with activation of the economic war against Nicaragua. The Reagan Administration also tries to involve international financial organizations in its actions.

Implementing these actions and the policy of open terror and aggression, at the same time, Washington does everything to block the possibility of achieving a just political settlement in Central America. This became very obvious when the far-reaching constructive proposals by the Nicaraguan Government were set off against the demagoguery of the White House. In fact, the American administration not only ignores the efforts undertaken by the states of the "contador" group, which have received wide support both in and outside Latin America, but directly tries to torpedo these efforts.

Recently, two highly placed Washington diplomats--H. Shlaudeman, special representative of the U.S. President in Central America, and L. Motley, U.S. assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs--made a trip to the region's countries, which the Reagan Administration tried to depict as an almost peace-making step. However, as it turned out in reality, this trip was only a regular propaganda maneuver, which was supposed to mislead the Latin American and international public and some of the U.S. congressmen opposing the political course of the Reagan Administration in Central America.

In order to try to knock down the wave of indignation at Washington's Central American policy, which is rising throughout the world, including in the United States, recently Reagan has declared that the White House allegedly is implementing a consistent policy aimed at a "peaceful settlement of the conflict in the region." In fact, however, this policy lies in an unceasing escalation of interventionist preparations and intensification of the regional conflict.

Thereby the Reagan Administration tries to weaken the international response to the success of the Nicaraguan revolution, which in 5 years under conditions rebuffing the intrigues of internal and foreign reaction has carried out reforms, which would require whole historical eras.

In unison with Reagan J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. permanent representative at the United Nations, wrote an article in THE WASHINGTON POST, again attempting to blacken the policy of progressive reforms implemented in Nicaragua. M. Ledeen, associate at the Center for Strategic and International Problems at Georgetown University, made the next attempt to place the Central American policy of the White House on some basis. He assessed the participation of the counterrevolutionary army of 11,000 people in armed actions against Nicaragua in northern regions and in the south of the Atlantic coast of that country as a moment "when an attempt to destroy a sovereign state is morally justified."

In the radio and television program "Face the Nation" D. Ortega, member of the National Directorate of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, coordinator of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction, declared that in defending their achievements, the people of Nicaragua were fully resolved to assert their right to self-determination. Sensible political figures in the countries of Western Europe, as well as in the United States, understand this. A number of prominent congressmen, candidates of the Democratic Party for the presidential post, W. Mondale, J. Hart and J. Jackson, sharply criticize the adventurist policy of the White House in Central America. "If the Reagan Administration continues to follow this faulty course," for example, W. Mondale, commenting on the employment of an ever bigger number of U.S. servicemen in the region, stressed, "ultimately, American troops will be drawn into a large-scale war in Central America."

The events occurring in and outside Central America make it possible to clearly see two different approaches to Nicaragua: on the one hand, Washington's impertinent hegemonist policy; on the other, the sober realism of the Sandinista revolutionary government and its support by states and political forces that also strive to find a political settlement for complex international problems.

The Soviet Union resolutely defends the sovereign rights of the region's nations and their peaceful and independent development. At the festive meeting devoted to the 114th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth V. I. Dolgikh, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, condemned the "unceasing actions of state terrorism with respect to Nicaragua, against which, in fact, an undeclared war is waged."

Creatively applying Sandino's precepts to present conditions, the present generation of Nicaraguan patriots in their stubborn fight against internal and foreign reaction asserts the sacred right of its people to independent development along the path of democracy and social progress.

This publication of a series of materials characterizing the social-political and economic achievements of the people of Nicaragua, the content of the basic stages in the development of the revolutionary process in it, the foreign policy of this country and the enhancement of its international prestige is devoted to an analysis of these problems.

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INTERNATIONAL

SOCIO-ECONOMIC, CLASS, POLITICAL NATURE OF NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 84 pp 9-22

/Article by Yu. N. Korolev: "Historical Experience of the Transitional Period"

/Text/ In the published research on the Nicaraguan revolution many problems were raised, the factual material was collected, analyzed and critically interpreted and a number of generalizing and fundamental conclusions were made. In this article I would like to dwell mainly on the international and national historical aspects of the importance of the revolution in their theoretical and practical political perspectives.

International Aspect

The Nicaraguan revolution as the subject of the world social process made a material contribution to the expansion of the anti-imperialist democratic camp. It was an important link in the international revolutionary front of struggle, taking upon itself part of the striking power of imperialism.

The victory of the Nicaraguan people showed the vulnerability of the preventive system of counterrevolution in Central America established by American imperialism, which in connection with the extremist reaction of the United States greatly expanded the front of social and political struggle in this region.

The profoundly terrorist nature of the gendarme activity of the United States and the narrowness of the political outlook of its ruling clique were revealed in the course of the Sandinista revolution. This evoked serious doubts among other capitalist states as to Washington's ability to protect the global interests of the entire world system of capitalism. Previously veiled and poorly reconcilable interimperialist contradictions--in a certain sense, a "crisis of the upper circles" of the capitalist system--were disclosed. The interventionist actions of the United States brought about a decisive condemnation of international social-democracy and some other bourgeois political circles of Western Europe and Latin America.

The Sandinista revolution emerged at the interface and tight juncture of problems, at which both contradictions determining the fundamental directions of the struggle during the present age and interimperialist contradictions, both

problems of international relations and of the class struggle were tied up. As events develop, democratic forces supporting Nicaragua consolidate themselves to an ever greater extent on the platform of social progress and national independence, the repressive policy of the United States is in an ever greater isolation and there is a deepening split in bourgeois circles, where the bourgeois-democratic position condemning terrorism and interventionism acquires an ever greater number of supporters. Thus, the Sandinista revolution has touched on all the "sore points" of the modern social process, which objectively reflects the parameters of its contribution to the international relations of the present time.

Theoretically, the most important lesson of the Nicaraguan revolution, first of all, is the fact that it has demonstrated the rise--in connection with the change in the correlation of forces in favor of the democratic and anti-imperialist camp--of the role of the external factor. In fact, the events of the latest decades, including the Cuban revolution, did not know such a unity and unanimity of the forces of socialism and of the proletarian and national liberation movement as during the decisive months and days for the Nicaraguan people. Moreover, (this is the second aspect of the Nicaraguan experience), movements, forces and governments, which can be characterized as moderate-progressive and centrist-democratic belonging to various sociohistorical "echelons," actively joined (in support of Nicaragua) the basic flows of the revolutionary movement of the present time. This concerns European social democracy, the non-aligned movement and nations and governments in most Latin American countries. Their position is officially established in the documents of congresses, conferences and conventions of the Socialist International, the nonaligned movement, socialist and social democratic parties, trade unions, associations of democratic community, the United Nations Organization, church representatives and the Organization of American States. Nicaragua was elected a member of the UN Security Council.

The lessons of Nicaragua indicate that in the world community there are problems capable of mobilizing a vast majority and of giving an impetus to a unity of actions in the name of progress and social justice. The Sandinista revolution outlined in a new way the circle of possible allies against extreme reaction and demonstrated that it (reaction) can be isolated, thrown into confusion and forced to retreat.

Content and Nature of the Revolution

The most important social and economic shifts and political events, which have made an imprint on the content and nature of the revolution, pertain to the 1960's and 1970's. In fact, during the period from 1960 through 1979 the share of the urban population increased from 38.4 to 56.6 percent. The country occupied the second place--after Panama--in Central America in the level of urbanization.¹ During that time the gross domestic product almost doubled--from 787 million to 1,546 million dollars² (in 1977 it even reached 2.2 billion dollars³). During that period the average rates of growth exceeded 5 percent annually (with the exception of the crisis year of 1975, when they comprised 2.4 percent⁴). On the whole, the rates of Nicaragua's economic growth during those years were approximately equal to the average indicators throughout Central

America. Industry developed even at outstripping rates and in 1975-1979 in the proportion of the processing industry in the structure of the gross domestic product Nicaragua occupied the first place in the region. The sector's share rose from 26.5 percent in 1960-1964 to 35.8 percent in 1975-1979 (the average indicator for all Central America during that 5-year period was 32.2 percent).⁵ Serious changes occurred in agriculture, whose marketability increased significantly. Suffice it to say that, whereas the share of the agricultural population during 1960-1979 was reduced from 61.6 to 43.4 percent, the share of agricultural production in the gross domestic product decreased only from 26.6 to 24.8 percent, which in absolute figures signified an increase in the gross agricultural product from 209.3 million to 545.6 million dollars.⁶

The fact that the economic development of Nicaragua in 1960-1970, as well as of all Central America, proceeded along the path of Central American integration with the participation of transnational capital was its characteristic feature. The sharp intensification of the export and import nature of the economy (determined by the goals of transnational corporations interested in the development of sectors and in the production of goods competitive at the world market) was the most important in this process. As a result, export in 1960-1979 rose from 188.7 million to 698 million dollars, greatly outstripping the growth of the gross domestic product (in 1960 export comprised 24 percent of the gross domestic product and in 1979, 45.2 percent). At the same time, import also rose, which was connected with the activation of transnational corporations: Agricultural and, in general, raw material specialization leading to the displacement of the production of consumer goods necessary for the population through the output of products for export necessitated an increase in import (in 1960-1975 import rose from 193.6 million to 569.5 million dollars). The rapid growth of the foreign debt was the second important indication of the activity of transnational corporations: In 1961 it totaled 41 million dollars and in 1979, 1.186 million dollars. In the first case its relationship to the gross domestic product comprised 11.6 percent and in the second, 56.8 percent.⁷ The introduction of transnational corporations into the basic sectors of the processing industry (a new phenomenon not characteristic of foreign capital during past years) was their third distinguishing feature. By the end of the 1970's transnational corporations kept 77.5 percent of the country's entire processing industry (together with the Somoza clan) under their control.⁸

All these processes were characterized by a rapid concentration of production and capital, strengthening of monopolistic clans in an alliance with foreign capital, destruction of middle and small local entrepreneurs and proletarianization of the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie. Although formally the per-capita gross domestic product rose considerably (from 554 dollars in 1960 to 800 dollars in 1977), these averaged figures did not show the entire depth of the aggravated social contradictions. Of course, the growth of production volumes, increase in the marketability of agriculture and development of industry as a whole and of its new sectors was not directly and adequately reflected in the rise in workers' material well-being. At the same time, however, they had a drastic effect on the role and place of its basic components--the working class, peasantry and middle strata--in society.

At the end of the 1970's the attained level of development of productive forces conflicts more and more sharply with the production relations formed in the country and with the entire social and political system.

In 1978-1979 the economic upsurge gave way to a sharp recession. Production declined by 7.2 and 25 percent respectively. Unemployment reached 40 to 50 percent of the entire gainfully employed population.⁹ The strike movement grew considerably and peasants stirred up rebellions in rural areas. Wide circles of the petty bourgeoisie and middle urban strata were activated. Significant fractions of the middle and big bourgeoisie, which previously cooperated with Somoza, joined the opposition to the regime.

The most profound social and economic crisis ensued. What are the reasons for it and what is its internal mechanism?

There is no doubt that the economic project of transnational corporations came to its logical conclusion in Nicaragua (in the same manner as prior to this in the 1970's--with a correction for the national specific character--in Chile, Portugal and Greece). Having reconstructed the "advanced sectors" of the economy in their own way and integrated them in the "transnational system," transnational corporations rendered the national economy lifeless, leaving the entire premonopolistic sector of the economy outside the "regulation." The relative weakness of the local middle bourgeoisie limited the policy of drawing these strata into "advanced sectors" by means of subcontracts and other forms of hire, a policy usually pursued by transnational corporations, or made it not very effective. As a result, the numerous groups of the middle (and even big on Nicaragua's scale), as well as petty, bourgeoisie proved to be the marginalized clan of Somoza and of the transnational corporations allied with him. Their economic interests entered into a sharp confrontation, which would be overcome only by means of strong currency infusions into the economy, the introduction of a system of maintenance and reconstruction of significant sectors of the national economy and the implementation of a deeply penetrating and differentiated policy of social regulation. However, transnational corporations, as in other cases, as well as the country's monopolistic bosses (the Somoza clan), preferred to allocate funds for an improvement in the repressive apparatus (a simpler way and, moreover, bringing a bigger income to a wide circle of people--from arms merchants to local officials). The alternative to the crisis within the framework of the capitalist system still existed, but the solution lay in the field of policy, not economy. Meanwhile, in this case transnational corporations adopted an economic, not political, decision. When in 1978-1979 it became clear that the regime could fall, they tried to save their property and capital investments. It was impossible to hide the "flight" of capital that began. It is characteristic that transnational corporations acted in exactly the same manner as in Chile in 1970, that is, such a "type of behavior" of transnational corporations under crisis conditions persisted during the past 10 years. However, it should be taken into consideration that, in contrast to the beginning of the 1970's, other "types of behavior" also exist now. Transnational corporations received training in various situations: For example, in 1975 ITT operated in Portugal differently and utilized different funds than in Chile in 1970-1973, although in the same, that is, counterrevolutionary, direction. Transnational corporations operating in such economically strong countries of

Latin America as Mexico and Brazil developed a distinctive "type of behavior." A certain glance into the future, certain long-term plans are taking shape here, not simply the shark's habit to grab what is within easy reach. At the proper time some representatives of transnational capital tried to dissociate themselves from Somoza and Somozism, which, so to speak, shifted the problem of relations with transnational corporations into a transitional period, but did not make it simpler. However, at the moment of the revolution transnational corporations, on the whole, supported the alternative of "Somozism without Somoza," which suited them completely, but, as events showed, was not a realistic way out of the general crisis, only an indicator of the collapse of the upper government echelon--the "crisis of the upper circles."

A situation, in which the ruling groups proved to be incapable of making reforms in public life from above, was historically formed in Nicaragua. Nor could the nationalistically minded bourgeoisie, which was unorganized and weak, force Somoza and Somozism, by means of "peaceful" pressure, to make changes. Social and economic development, which the country had undergone by that time, led to the strengthening of the working class, which could not fail to play an important role in the antidictatorial movement. The dictatorship brought social tension to an armed struggle and a civil war, in the course of which the most radical circles of fighters occupied leading positions to an ever greater extent. The most exploited and conscious political strata of the population, that is, first of all, the proletariat, middle urban strata and the peasantry, were their social support.

In the early 1970's wage laborers comprised 58 percent of the economically active population (approximately 70 percent in urban areas and 40 percent in rural areas). The country's working class, which united no less than two-thirds of all the wage laborers, was transformed into the most prominent and leading force of social progress. The industrial and agricultural proletariat comprised no less than 40 percent of the economically active population. The peasantry remained the second social category in its size--approximately 23 percent. Middle urban strata (about 18 percent), that is, students, some employees, professional people, teachers and so forth, appeared as an important detachment of the popular movement. Urban strata of the petty bourgeoisie and of artisans, which comprised approximately 15 to 17 percent of the entire economically active population, played an active role in the struggle, especially at the last stage.

Thus, in the 1970's Nicaragua was a country deeply integrated into the world system of the capitalist economy. It was experiencing the most severe crisis caused by the critical state of world capitalism, as well as by the local economy. The working class, which acquired important revolutionary experience in the course of the 1978-1979 class struggles, played the leading role in the process of the country's social development. At the same time, a genuine social war of the peasantry against landowners, the petty and middle local bourgeoisie, Somoza's monopolistic clan and foreign capital was waged in the country. In its economic content the revolution that was brewing in the country could be only socialist. However, the objective need for the solution of a number of problems connected with the existence of precapitalist relations in rural areas and with antimonomopolistic and anti-imperialist tasks, as well as the public nature of the antidictatorial struggle, make it possible to define the revolution in its nature and moving forces as democratic and popular.

Formation of the Revolutionary Vanguard

At the end of 1978 the revolutionary movement in Nicaragua developed a tactics of struggle against the dictatorship. It reached a high degree of readiness, mobilization and organization, actually creating the forms of the future state system, including local authorities, the people's militia and professional armed forces in the form of subdivisions of the Sandinista National Liberation Front. At the same time, in parallel to the examined events the most complex process of formation of supreme bodies of the revolution, primarily its political vanguard, occurred.

From the point of view of the political program two anti-Somoza forces existed in the country. They differed in the fact that one sought to destroy the dictatorship and the entire system of the formed regime, while the second only wished to remove Somoza and his clan from power, preserving the system. An intense fight for the masses was waged between them. The bulk of the masses was spontaneously inclined toward the revolution and believed that with Somoza's fall Somozism would disappear naturally. This enabled the political advocates of the solution "Somozism without Somoza" to manipulate the mass movement. Only the experience of a local struggle could lead to the necessary rise in the political consciousness of the masses and, accordingly, to a precise development of strategic and tactical positions of their political leaders.

In organizational terms at the beginning of the concluding stage of the civil war of 1978-1979 the situation was as follows: The Democratic Liberation Union (UDEL) established in December 1974 existed. It included both the advocates of the reformist and, in part, of the revolutionary solution. The circles of the local bourgeoisie played the leading role in UDEL. P. J. Chamorro, director of the largest opposition newspaper LA PRENSA, was its leader. In 1977 UDEL was activated. The crimes of the regime were denounced in its press organs, its committees of solidarity with the antidictatorial movement were established in neighboring countries, including the United States, and steps were taken to mobilize the trade-union and peasant movement, as well as students. P. J. Chamorro was transformed into a figure of national importance, whom the Carter Government was inclined to consider a possible candidate for the post of the country's president.

The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) operated in the country as of 1961. In December 1974 the front organized the seizure of the private residence of millionaire M.Castillo and (in exchange for hostages) attained the release of several FSLN members and leaders, broadcast of the front's program over mass information channels and payment of a sum of 1 million dollars. In January 1975 Somoza declared a state of siege, which lasted until September 1977. Repressions befell the country. At the end of 1976 members of punitive expeditions succeeded in delivering heavy blows at FSLN detachments. Many of the front's leaders, including Carlos Fonseca Amador, died in battles.

In October 1977 the Sandinistas began active operations against the dictatorship, delivering several blows at it simultaneously in rural and urban areas.

The general strikes of the Nicaraguan proletariat in January and August 1978, as well as in June 1979, were of decisive importance for the mobilization of the social base of the revolution. Each of these three actions is a landmark in the forward movement of the revolution.

The general strike in January 1978 accompanied by demonstrations and uprisings in a number of cities in the country, first, showed the high mobilizing ability of the proletariat (in Managua alone more than 300,000 people went out into the streets). Second, it demonstrated the readiness of the working class for an uncompromising fight against the dictatorship. Despite the most brutal repression, workers' actions did not stop and barricades appeared on the streets of the capital. Third, the working class demonstrated its readiness to go beyond the moderate demands of the bourgeois-democratic opposition (when on 7 February bourgeois leaders in agreement with the U.S. Embassy called for the cessation of the general strike, the working class refused to obey, actually crossing over to the side of those who demanded an end to the dictatorship).

On the one hand, in the course of these events UDEL showed its ability (thanks to the leftist parties and workers' federations forming part of it) to mobilize the masses for a fight, but, on the other, its limited possibilities as a leader of a popular movement quickly became clear. At the moment when this became obvious and workers, despite the support of trade unions and the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), began to retreat, the Sandinistas joined the fight. They demonstrated noncompromise in battle, fearlessness before the national guard and the ability to protect the striking workers and demonstrators. However, they also were forced to retreat. Nevertheless, a contact was established between the FSLN and radical groups in the leadership of the working class movement, primarily with communists, who also fought in the January and February battles until the end.

The January action placed on the agenda the problem of the revolutionary vanguard as the single leadership of the popular movement. It showed that this vanguard was not yet formed definitively, but its basic components were disclosed. The January-February battles of the working class led to its radicalization and understanding of the need for joint actions on the part of all democratic forces and their direct coordination.

Realization of the possibility of overthrowing the dictatorship and of the need for creating a mechanism of expropriation of power by the people was the most important result of the clash between the proletariat and the regime in January 1978. Furthermore, it became clear that the political associations opposing the regime (the Democratic Liberation Union and the Sandinista National Liberation Front) in the form in which they existed then were not yet ready to perform the role of this mechanism.

The intensity of the class and political struggle in rural areas increased sharply by that time. The first spontaneous uprising by Indians flared up in Monimbo, a suburb of Masaya, in February 1978. It was headed by Camillo Ortega (a brother of Daniel and Umberto Ortega), a native of these places, who died in a clash with Somoza's troops. The uprising meant that the revolution began to win the second social battle as well. Masses of the working class had already crossed over to its side (during the fights of January-February 1978) and now the same occurred among the peasantry. It was very important that, essentially, these processes coincided in time.

Self-made armed combat equipment--incendiary and contact bombs, grenade launchers and mortars--was first utilized on a large scale in the course of the fights in Monimbo, becoming generally widespread subsequently. Furthermore, tactical methods of conducting a combat against the National Guard, which proved to be so effective in 1979, were used there for the first time. Detachments of 10 to 15 people were formed. They laid ambushes in homes, attacked patrols, in this way clearing entire quarters of government troops and, if necessary, immediately dissolved among the civilian population of their region (it is precisely where they operated). The experience of Monimbo made it possible to establish the combat unit of the volunteer corps--detachments of the people's militia.

During that period leftist forces formulated (jointly and separately) the object of the struggle--Somoza's overthrow, establishment of a democratic government and implementation of social and economic reforms--and determined the ways of attaining it: mobilization of the entire nation against the dictatorship, dissolution of the National Guard, creation of a national army for the protection of the country's sovereignty and formation of a national government representing all the population groups that participated in the regime's overthrow. The PSN began a sharp debate on the problem of what path to follow--the path of an unarmed mobilization of the people or an armed struggle? There was a split along the following line: One group joined the FSLN and the other continued to utilize primarily peaceful political forms of struggle.

The Sandinistas more and more realized the need for the unity of all antidictatorial forces. In October 1977 they established the "group of 12," which included authoritative representatives of the advanced circles of the intelligentsia, priests and entrepreneurs. This group declared the impossibility of a victory without the Sandinistas and carried out extensive mobilization work in the bourgeois and petty bourgeois strata of the population. Those representatives of it that were forced to leave the country established contacts in Latin American and European countries, as well as in the United States, and laid down the foundations for international relations of the Sandinistas, ensuring moral and material support for the revolution.

The events that occurred in August-September 1978 represented the next stage in the formation of the social base of the revolution and its vanguard. They began with the seizure by the Sandinistas of the national palace in Managua on 22 August 1978. In September a general strike was declared and uprisings began in the country's main cities. The National Guard in these cities was destroyed or blockaded in barracks and columns of the FSLN and rebels passed along streets. Somoza sent the aviation against the rebels, concentrated his troops and after bloody battles the centers of uprising fell.

The August-September battles showed the full moral and political readiness of the working class and popular masses for a decisive battle against the dictatorship and the high mobilizing ability of revolutionary forces. The masses demonstrated a high (perhaps even the highest) ability for revolutionary creativity. Wherever the rebels seized power, they established civil defense committees, which were responsible for the organization of a quarter's defense, supply for the fighters, communication, distribution of weapons and so forth.

The revolution received the highest form of the people's organization--an organization capable of assuming power in the localities. This was the most important historical achievement of the uprising.

In the course of the battle the influence of the FSLN grew and its relations with the working class and the peasant movement and with leftist parties were strengthened. The leadership of the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) saw a real danger of a complete loss of control over the events, began to maneuver and established contacts with U.S. representatives in order to jointly find the way of removing Somoza and of solving the crisis in the interest of the bourgeoisie without the participation of the Sandinistas and leftist forces. However, the popular fight again exceeded the boundaries acceptable to the compromising bourgeoisie. The leftists in the FAO and in the movement connected with the activity of the "group of 12" exposed the leaders' maneuvers and their attempts to make a deal with the United States and with Somoza's followers. The front split and all the parties except the advocates of the solution of "Somozism without Somoza" left it.

The revolutionary democratic movement rallied around the United People's Movement (MPU). The Sandinistas, the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, revolutionary student and youth organizations, leftist parties, basic professional centers, civil defense committees, strike committees, rayon committees, associations of mothers and so forth joined it in November-December 1978. The National Patriotic Front (FPN) was established in January-February 1979. Along with the MPU parties and organizations that left the FAO, that is, the Independent Liberal Party, the "group of 12," the Center of Nicaraguan Workers, the National Socialist-Christian Party, the trade union of radio journalists in Managua, the Workers' Front and others, joined it. The MPU and the FPN adopted a program, whose basic points were the following: the dictator's overthrow, dissolution of the National Guard and nationalization of the property of the Somoza clan. This program reflected the establishment of the FSLN hegemony in the revolutionary process.

The battle against the dictatorship, in which, at the same time, a debate on the strategy and tactics of the democratic revolutionary struggle and on the question as to who would head the revolution was held, led the FSLN to a solid unity and power and UDEL, to a deep demarcation of the class and political forces participating in it and to its disappearance from the battle arena.

Revolutionary Democratic Regime

The final offensive of the revolution began to unfold in March-April 1979. On 4 June the FSLN called for a general strike, which, in fact, paralyzed the entire country. At the same time, all the country's main cities, that is, Jinotega, Matagalpa, Esteli, Masaya, Granada and Managua, rose up in arms.

A provisional government, which included the representatives of the FSLN, the "group of 12," the MPU and entrepreneurs, was established on 16 June. The United States made the last effort and offered its mediation in the attainment of an agreement on Somoza's resignation and transfer of power to the FSLN with only one condition--to preserve the inviolability of the National Guard, whose leadership resolutely declared that it would continue the war against the people.

The fight continued for 2 more weeks, no longer against Somoza, but against the system of rule protected by the guardsmen. In fact, this was a civil war between the revolutionary people and advocates of the solution of "Somozism without Somoza," who prior to the fall of 1978 had taken part in the opposition movement.

FSLN detachments entered Managua on 19 July 1979. The revolution won. At the same time, it destroyed the old repressive apparatus of the bourgeois state, established its own people's army and militia and leaned on mass organizations actively participating in the revolution.

The construction of a new state system began.

The following were the first government measures: nationalization of banks, establishment of state monopoly over foreign trade, expropriation of the property of Somoza and his stooges and establishment of a strong state economic sector on this basis, beginning of implementation of the first phase of the agrarian reform and declaration of the country's natural resources as state property.

The economic, political and social program, as well as the Law on the Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans, became the two basic directive documents outlining the policy of the revolutionary government. The first laid the foundations for a mixed economy of a "pluralistic" society and independent foreign policy. The second document restored civil democratic rights.

Local authorities were established, the Sandinista people's army and new police were formed out of FSLN fighters and the judicial authority was reorganized. The FSLN as the most powerful and organized political power, rightfully winning the role of the vanguard, performs the leading role in the state.

Concentrating full political power in its hands and implementing important measures for the restoration of the economy and strengthening of the country's defense capacity, the FSLN leans on the support of broad popular masses and on democratic--trade-union, women's and youth--organizations. The role of trade unions forming part of Nicaragua's coordinating trade union body, which supports the principle of a firm unity of the working class and the poorest peasantry, considering these forces the moving forces of the Sandinista people's revolution, has risen significantly in the new political system.

Sandinista defense committees (CDS) play an important role. Formed out of the civil defense committees, which operated during the period of struggle against the dictatorship (9 September 1978 is considered the official date of the birth of Sandinista defense committees), they carry out work in city quarters and rural regions and repulse the intrigues of reactionary forces. CDS members actively participate in the abolition of illiteracy and other consequences of the dictatorial regime, mobilize the population for voluntary labor (unpaid mass work on Saturdays and so forth), wage a fight against speculation, patrol at night, form part of the subdivisions of the Sandinista people's militia and so forth. CDS have effective tools of the revolution contributing in the maximum possible way, together with other Sandinista organizations, to its development.

Some Problems of the Transitional Period

At the stage of the struggle for power and during the 5 years of construction of the new society the Sandinista revolution confirmed the characteristics of the 1970's, which other revolutions of this decade also showed, that is, the new aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism connected with the process of internationalization (in a specific historical form--transnationalization) of capital and leading to a reduction in the geopolitical area of the capitalist system.

At the same time, this revolution introduced some new aspects into the creative experience of the struggle of the popular masses confirming a number of general laws of the revolutionary process and showing the specificity of the modern period of development. It confirmed the need for the democratic stage for capitalist countries with a mixed economy and a strong dependence on foreign monopolistic capital, showed once again that the working class in an alliance with revolutionary democracy (peasantry and middle and petty bourgeois urban strata) was the main force of the democratic revolution and demonstrated the high ability of the revolution to protect itself from imperialism and the counterrevolution if a revolutionary democratic regime was established, that is, on condition that the bourgeois state machine was broken up and that there was an all-around mass revolutionary organization of the people.

In contrast to the revolutions that suffered defeat during those years the Sandinista revolution shattered the old power machinery (the Chilean revolution could not attain this) and established a popular revolutionary democratic regime (which the April revolution of 1974 in Portugal could not do). In the course of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua the leading role of the working class was strengthened and stable forms of alliance of popular strata were found.

The Sandinista revolution has disclosed additional and in many respects specific features of formation of the political vanguard in countries of a similar type. The experience of Nicaragua has shown that the formation of the political vanguard of a democratic revolution represents a complex process of establishment of a revolutionary guidance of a popular movement. This process determines the beginning of a new stage in historical development, which is institutionally manifested in the formation of a revolutionary democratic regime.

Another theoretical aspect of this experience concerns the preservation of the attained unity at the next stage--during the transitional period.

The Sandinista leadership has made considerable efforts so that the world community and the forces that supported the revolution at the stage of the fight for power may be informed and retain their sympathies or at least hold neutral positions with respect to the developing revolutionary process. The weighed internal and peace loving active foreign policy played an important part in this. As a result, the attempts to establish a blockade and to isolate Nicaragua in the capitalist world have been frustrated. Mutually advantageous relations with socialist countries have been established and are developing.

Nevertheless, attention should be drawn to the complex nature of formation of the external factor in the transitional period and the effect of the counter-revolutionary course of the United States on it, which, as it seems, is directed toward the creation of a situation forcing the Sandinista leadership to resort to the most radical and extreme measures of protection of national sovereignty.

The government measures inevitable in such a situation are readily interpreted by the bourgeoisie and by part of the peasantry as a social class attack on their economic and other interests.

The spread of opposition moods within the country (in connection with the forced radicalization) is immediately projected on the external sphere, giving rise to critical speeches on the part of social democracy, some Latin American governments and the church. The purport of the extremist pressure of the United States on Nicaragua is to destroy the broad international front of solidarity with the revolutionary people and to force them to resign themselves to the previous situation in the system of imperialist rule. The question as to whether this action strengthens the revolutionary democratic regime or weakens it determines the depth of and the need for specific social-economic and political solutions at the transitional stage. The main strength of the Nicaraguan revolution lies in its very nature determined by the wide participation of the popular masses led by the Sandinista National Liberation Front.

FOOTNOTES

1. CHILE-AMERICA, Roma, 1982, N 76-77, p 94.
2. Ibid, p 95.
3. POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, Paris, 1983, N 20, p 50.
4. ENVÍO, Managua, 1982, N 13, p 10.
5. CHILE-AMERICA, 1982, N 76-77, p 97.
6. Ibid, pp 95-97.
7. Ibidem.
8. D.Castillo Rivas, "Acumulación de capital y empresas transnacionales en Centroamérica," México, 1980, p 75.
9. CHILE-AMERICA, 1982, N 76-77, p 96.

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INTERNATIONAL

SANDINISTA ECONOMIC POLICIES ASSESSED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 84 pp 35-47

[Article by T. V. Saprykova-Saminskaya: "Along the Path of Economic Reforms"]

[Text] The process of a fundamental structural reorganization of the Nicaraguan economy coincided in time with the period of a sharp intensification of U.S. aggression and Central American policy. After the accession of the Reagan Administration to power, official Washington uses a diverse arsenal of methods of a financial, diplomatic and military nature to stifle the Sandinista revolution.

Under conditions of a constant threat of intervention in March 1982 the Nicaraguan Government was forced to declare a state of emergency and to divert substantial material and human resources for defense needs, which had an effect on the rates of economic development. Moreover, armed invasions by counterrevolutionary gangs do appreciable material damage. However, despite the unfavorable conditions the country's economic potential is growing and its foreign economic relations are developing.

State Sector Is the Basis for the National Economy

The economic policy of the revolution is directed toward the establishment of a mixed economy, within the framework of which state, cooperative, private and state-private sectors would coexist. At the same time, the leading role in the development of the national economy is assigned to the state sector--the people's property sphere. In particular, Jaime Wheelock, Nicaragua's minister of agricultural development and agrarian reform, speaking of the significance of the people's property sphere, noted the following: "This is the center, this is the core, this is what makes it possible to clearly determine the gap between the old method of production and the new one that we want to develop."²

The people's property sphere was formed on the basis of the 1979 decrees on the confiscation of the property of Somoza's family and stooges, nationalization of local banks, insurance companies, the mining industry, forestry and fishing and the establishment of state monopoly on all operations connected with the sale of traditional export products (cotton, coffee, sugar, beef and sea products), as well as imports. The positions of the state sector were strengthened considerably after the confiscation in 1981 of 15 industrial enterprises, whose owners engaged in counterrevolutionary activity. At the same time, trade in nontraditional goods of Nicaraguan export was placed under state control.

As a result of the purposeful policy of the Sandinista leadership on strengthening the state sector its proportion in the gross domestic product increased from 15 percent in 1978 to 41 percent in 1980 and the proportion of the private sector decreased from 85 to 59 percent respectively.³

In 1980 the Nicaraguan state allocated 2.23 billion cordobas for the development of the national economy, which comprised 83 percent of the total investments, and in 1981, a total of 4.1 billion cordobas, or 87 percent of the total capital investments.⁴ During that period 35 percent of the state investments were made in the production sector, which was subject to the solution of the problem of a more dynamic development, first of all, of material production sectors.⁵

A total of 68 state enterprises managed by the People's Industrial Corporation (COIP) function in Nicaragua's industry.⁶ Enterprises of the people's property sphere produce more than 25 percent of the output of the processing industry and 95 percent of the output of the extractive industry. In the processing industry state positions are most significant in the production of metal products, building materials and food and textile sectors.

In agriculture--the basic sector of the Nicaraguan economy--81 enterprises were established on the basis of 2,200 farms confiscated from Somoza. Their activity is directed by the Nicaraguan Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA). The state sector now accounts for 23 percent of the cultivated land and 25 percent of the production of agricultural products, including cotton, 21.2 percent; coffee, 20.3 percent; sugar, 43 percent; tobacco, 50 percent; rice, 42.2 percent; sorghum, 21 percent; milk, 30 percent; beef, 35 percent; pork, 20 percent; poultry meat, 25 percent; and eggs, 28.7 percent. At the same time, 13 percent of the agricultural manpower is employed on the farms of the people's property sphere.⁷

A total of 65 percent of the means of transport and communication also belong to the state. It controls more than one-half of the service sphere.⁸

The strengthening and development of the state sector encounter a number of difficulties. For example, it must not be forgotten that during the years of the civil war material damage estimated at 150 million dollars was done to the enterprises of the present state sector.⁹ Furthermore, owing to the needs of a defense nature, there is a shortage of funds for the purchase of new and modernization of obsolete equipment, a deficiency of skilled and, especially, highly skilled manpower is felt, the profitability of some enterprises is low and experience in economic management is still insufficient. At the same time, these difficulties are of a temporary nature objectively brought about both by the scale of the envisaged prospects and backwardness of the inherited economy.

In the economic strategy of the revolutionary government an important role is also assigned to the private sector, whose directions and conditions of activity are determined by national economic development programs. It is believed that it can make a contribution to the advance of agriculture, industry and trade. For these purposes the activity of the private enterprise is stimulated by the state by means of the price mechanism and tax, credit and currency policy. For example, in 1982 the private sector received from state banks 60.5

percent of all the credits and 66.8 percent of the foreign currency. These and other important economic measures have given an additional impetus to the growth of production of agricultural and industrial products for export, because the private sector accounts for about two-thirds of the export output. The creation in the country of an economic model offering guarantees and incentives for private entrepreneurs expressing the desire to participate in the country's revival is the policy of the Sandinista leadership.

At the present stage of development of Nicaraguan society the Nicaraguan Government also comes out in favor of attracting and using foreign capital for the purpose of the most rapid solution of urgent economic problems. However, preference is given to the organization of mixed companies with a predominant share of state participation. Such an approach is brought about by the strategy of a gradual structural economic reorganization.

Realization of the Economic Reconstruction Program

The reconstruction of the economy destroyed during the civil war and the satisfaction of the population's urgent needs were the immediate problems in the economic field, whose solution predetermined the development of postrevolutionary Nicaragua to a significant degree. A short-term plan for economic development for 1980-1981--"Extraordinary Program for the Revival of the Economy for the Good of the People"--was worked out and adopted for these purposes. It set as its goal the attainment in key economic sectors of the prerevolutionary level of development, which would serve as the basis for subsequent economic reconstruction and lessening of the economic dependence on the United States. The fact that during the last year of the Somoza Government the volume of the gross domestic product dropped to the 1962 level pointed out the importance of the task set.¹⁰

As a result of the realization of this plan in 1980 the increase in the gross domestic product comprised 10.7 percent and in 1981, 7 percent.¹¹ The planned assignments for the restoration of industrial production were fulfilled 90 percent in 1980 and 98.5 percent in 1981.¹² The high levels of increase in the gross domestic product during that period were attained to a significant degree owing to the more dynamic development of the nonproductive sphere as compared with the growth of material production sectors.

In 1982 the increase in the gross domestic product slowed down for the above-mentioned reasons. At the same time, the situation in the private sector mostly affected the dynamics of the gross domestic product. For example, in 1982 the volume of industrial production in the private sector declined by 11.7 percent as compared with 1981,¹³ whereas in the state sector it rose 4.1 percent. Food, textile and chemical industries and metalworking experienced the greatest difficulties.

The vulnerability of the private enterprise sector, which was manifested in 1982, introduced certain amendments to the economic reconstruction program. Principal attention was concentrated on the advance of the economy through the development of the production of the most competitive Nicaraguan export products. Agriculture, which accounts for 70 percent of Nicaragua's currency

proceeds, that is, about 340 million dollars, is of special importance for it.¹⁴ On the basis of the country's favorable natural and climatic conditions two main tasks are set for it: To increase the production of export crops and to attain self-sufficiency in the products that have to be imported now.

The production of coffee--the most important export crop--reached the prerevolutionary level. Moreover, the highest harvest throughout the country's history, which totaled 1.4 million quintals (1 quintal=46 kg), was gathered during the 1982/83 agricultural year.¹⁵ Last year the cotton harvest reached 4,253,000 quintals, although it did not reach the maximum possible level.¹⁶ Owing to floods it was not possible to sow this crop on the planned area.¹⁷ However, the unwillingness of the private sector, which, incidentally, accounts for 80 percent of its production, to restore sown areas was the main reason for this. During the agricultural year of 1983/84, for the purpose of the further advance of cotton growing, sown areas in the state sector, as well as in cooperative and individual peasant farms, were expanded.

To increase the production of sugar, an export crop third in importance, the largest combine for sugar cane processing and sugar production in Central America is now being built with Cuba's technical and financial assistance. In early 1985 the operating capacities of this enterprise will make it possible to increase sugar production by 50 percent. Sugar export will additionally give about 50 million dollars to the country.¹⁸

For Nicaragua's self-sufficiency in basic food crops (corn, kidney beans, rice and sorghum) a national food program envisaging a transition to the export of the surplus of these crops in the future is implemented. Credits are given to small producers, whose farms account for more than 80 percent of the production of basic grain crops. The government also stimulates the cultivation of these crops through an increase in purchase prices.

The highest harvests of basic food crops in the country's entire history were obtained in 1981-1982. However, the outstripping growth of the population's needs and demand did not make it possible to attain a full self-sufficiency in them. To solve this problem, areas under these crops were expanded in 1983. Great importance is attached to the introduction of the latest agrotechnical methods into agriculture.

The greatest complications have arisen in the restoration of animal husbandry. The consequences of the driving of a significant part of the cattle by Somoza's followers to Honduras and Costa Rica, as well as the droughts in the summer of 1982, are reflected here. For a more rapid provision of the population with meat products the government places emphasis on an accelerated development of poultry and hog breeding. For example, capital investments in poultry breeding total 250 million dollars. The national plan for the development of animal husbandry envisages the construction of two plants for milk production in Managua and Matagalpa and the execution of a number of other projects.¹⁹

Along the path of realization of the envisaged reforms the Nicaraguan Government encountered difficulties primarily in the inclusion of part of the national bourgeoisie in the process of economic reconstruction. The sharp decrease

in private investments in the economy and the transfer of capital abroad is an indication of this. For example, whereas in 1970-1978, on the average, private investments made up 12.2 percent of the gross domestic product annually, in 1980-1981, only 3.4 percent.²⁰ With regard to the transfer of capital abroad, 640 million dollars were taken out of the country during the 1978-1982 period.²¹ Meanwhile, the shortage of currency proceeds also hampers the rates of development of agriculture. There is a shortage of funds for the import of new agricultural machines and mechanisms and of spare parts for them, for the construction of agroindustrial enterprises and for the mastering of new areas.

The problem of the foreign currency deficit is also aggravated by the sharp increase in the expenditures on import, which is due primarily to the fluctuation of prices on the world market. In particular, in Nicaragua in 1982 petroleum import accounted for 178 million dollars, that is, about 23 percent, whereas in 1978, for 89 million dollars.²² This in turn affected the profitability of some enterprises and the increase in costs in agriculture.

In connection with this the liquidation of the dependence on petroleum import acquires special importance for the production of electric power, because at present thermal electric power stations account for 52 percent of the generated electric power and GES, for only 39 percent.²³ For this the construction of geothermal and hydroelectric power stations based on the plans of the Nicaraguan Institute of Power Engineering developed until the year 2000 was begun in the country. The first stage of a geothermal electric power station at the Momotombo volcano of a capacity of 35 MW was commissioned in July 1983, which comprises 12 percent of the installed electric power capacities. The commissioning of this station alone will make it possible to annually save substantial funds on petroleum import.²⁴ The construction of its stage, as well as the construction of the Asturias GES, was begun. For the financing of the last project the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development granted credit totaling 34.4 million dollars to Nicaragua in September 1982.²⁵

Of course, the limitation of internal currency resources forces the country to resort to the attraction of loans on a bilateral and multilateral basis, which leads to an increase in the foreign debt and, accordingly, in the payments for its liquidation. Nicaragua's foreign debt increased from 1.6 billion dollars in July 1979 to 3.8 billion dollars in the middle of 1983. It should be noted that the foreign debt of other countries of this continent, for example, such as Brazil or Mexico, grew more rapidly. According to estimated data, in 1983 the expenditures on servicing Nicaragua's foreign debt totaled 150 to 200 million dollars.²⁶ The Reagan Administration pursues in international financial organizations a policy of boycott against granting preferential credits and loans to Nicaragua. As a result, in 1982 Nicaragua's foreign loans were reduced to 270 million dollars, that is, in one-half as compared with 1979.²⁷

With due regard for these difficulties the Government of Nicaragua purposefully pursues the policy of further social and economic reforms laying down the foundation for development not suffering from fluctuations in the conditions on the world capitalist market. In particular, the tendency toward ensuring full employment confirms the correctness of this course. As of 1979 the number of the unemployed was reduced from 35 to 16 percent.²⁸

Stages in Agrarian Reforms

The transformation of agriculture into a highly profitable economic sector is of special importance for Nicaragua's reconstruction. Therefore, a gradual implementation of radical reforms in rural areas was begun immediately after the victory of the revolution. The uneven distribution of land property, existence of relics of feudalism and extremely low labor productivity in agriculture hampered Nicaragua's economic development. Before the revolution 41 percent of the land suitable for cultivation belonged to 1,700 big landowners, whereas the farms of more than 100,000 small producers accounted for only 15 percent of the agricultural land.²⁹ A significant part of the peasants did not have land at all and were forced to lease it.

At the first stage (July 1979-1981) on the basis of decrees Nos 3 and 38 the land of Somoza and his stooges totaling 1.4 million manzanas, which comprised 20 percent of the country's agricultural land, was confiscated.³⁰ J. Wheelock described this stage in agrarian reforms as the anti-Somoza stage.³¹ A total of 27 percent of the estates concentrating 43 percent of the land belonging to big latifundium owners were transferred to state ownership. This dealt a perceptible blow to the positions of big owners. The confiscation of a significant part of the agricultural land, formation of the state sector and peasant associations and implementation of agrarian reforms at the first stage initiated the changes in the structure of land ownership in Nicaragua (see table).³²

Distribution of Production Resources Throughout Agricultural Sectors, %

Sector	Share in number of farms		Share in land area		Share in cost of output		Share in manpower	
	1978	1980	1978	1980	1978	1980	1978	1980
State sector	-	1.3	-	21.5	-	14.2	-	13.3
Entrepreneurial (capitalist)	23.9	22.6	86	64.5	76.7	65.5	53.2	39.9
Individual peasant and cooperative	76.1	76.1	14.0	14.0	23.3	23.3	46.8	46.8

State farms and peasant associations (cooperatives) specializing in the cultivation of basic food crops were formed on the confiscated land. Furthermore, production cooperatives were also established on land leased from big landowners. In addition to production cooperatives consumer cooperatives began to appear in Nicaragua. A total of 2,512 cooperatives were established at the first stage of agrarian reforms. A total of 1,327 of them were production cooperatives and 1,185, credit and service cooperatives.³³

The government lowered the rent considerably, established its maximum amount (100 cordobas per manzana for basic production crops and 300 cordobas for cotton) and obligated big landowners to lease land traditionally leased by peasants, as well as unutilized land. These measures stimulated primarily the formation of a mass cooperative movement in the country, which led to an improvement in the living conditions of the peasantry and to an eradication of such archaic forms of rent relations as medieria, sharecropping, colonialism and so forth.

The maximum possible stimulation of production by granting financial assistance to farms of small producers, primarily peasants united into cooperatives, became an important direction in agrarian policy. State credits granted to small peasant farms by the Administration for Assistance to Peasantry (PROCAMPO) of the Ministry of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform increased sevenfold in 1980 as compared with 1978, totaling 1,006 million cordobas. Their share in the total volume of agricultural credits rose from 6.3 percent in 1978 to 20.8 percent in 1980.³⁴

In 1980 a total of 97,000 small agricultural producers (81 percent of their total number) received credits, whereas in 1978 only 18 percent of the peasants could count on them.³⁵ In 1980 a total of 76 percent of the peasants that received credits were in cooperatives.³⁶ Furthermore, the lower interest rates on credits for them (7 to 8 percent as compared with 11 to 14 percent for the private sector) serve as an additional incentive for the development of the cooperative movement in the country.

The adoption in July 1981 of the agrarian reform law and in September of the same year of the law on cooperatives marks the beginning of the second stage in the process of revolutionary reforms in rural areas. These acts are to strengthen the social base of the revolution and to increase the contribution of both the peasantry and big private capitalist entrepreneurs to the realization of the program for the advance of agricultural production.

Article 1 of the agrarian reform law guarantees the preservation of private ownership of land regardless of its size, provided it is utilized fully and efficiently.³⁷ At the same time, the law provides for the confiscation of land that is not cultivated, utilized inefficiently, abandoned and leased. At the same time, the maximum amount of land ownership, to which the operation of this law does not apply, is established. It is 500 manzanas in the zone of the Pacific Ocean coast, which includes the departments of Managua, Masaya, Carazo, Granada, Rivas, Chinandega and Leon, as well as in the departments of Jinotega and Matagalpa, and 1,000 manzanas for the country's other regions. According to preliminary estimates the implementation of the agrarian reform will make it possible to confiscate 2.3 million manzanas, which makes up approximately 30 percent of the land suitable for an efficient cultivation.³⁸ The law stipulates the payment of compensations for the confiscated land in agrarian reform bonds.

According to article 9 of the agrarian reform law the confiscated land will be distributed among landless peasants and peasants with insufficient land, sharecroppers and farm laborers, as well as transferred to cooperative and state farms for use. In accordance with government priorities the confiscated areas are intended primarily for cooperative land use.

From the beginning of the realization of the agrarian reform law more than 574,000 manzanas were transferred to peasant associations and individual producers from October 1981 until the end of 1983.³⁹ Another 720,000 manzanas are to be transferred to peasants for use in 1984.⁴⁰ As a result of the implementation of agrarian reforms at two stages 40 percent of the cultivated land in Nicaragua began to belong to the state and cooperatives.⁴¹ This is

how the provision of the Program of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction in Nicaragua on the priority organization for production purposes of various associations on the confiscated land, which will ensure the realization of the public function of property, is being implemented.

The law on cooperatives, which according to Salvador Mayorga, deputy minister of agricultural development and agrarian reform, is to put an end to the uncontrolled and spontaneous establishment of peasant associations,⁴² at times leading to an unsubstantiated seizure of the land of middle and small agricultural producers, is an important supplement to the agrarian reform. Its main goal is to regulate the processes of formation, functioning and development of agricultural associations as an efficient tool of the peasantry's participation in the accomplishment of the revolution's tasks, primarily in the fulfillment of the plans for agricultural production and for the population's provision with food products. The development of cooperatives in two forms--producer and consumer cooperatives--is envisaged.

In practice, in addition to these two forms of peasant associations, in the country there are cooperatives, which are not permanent, but are established by seasonal agricultural workers for the time when they are not employed in the harvesting of export crops. They are formed mainly on land granted by the state or leased from big latifundium owners.

According to the data of the report of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua to the State Council of 4 May 1983, 3,057 peasant cooperatives of various types, which unite more than 60,000 people, function in the country. In other words, 50 percent of the small and middle peasants are involved in cooperatives.⁴³

The restoration and further development of the national economy of Nicaragua depends to a certain extent on the viability of the people's property sphere. Therefore, the improvement in the organizational structure of the state sector, refinement in the mechanism of its management, increase in the economic efficiency of production and strengthening of labor discipline at its enterprises become some of the main tasks at the present stage. To further advance the cooperative movement, the government reviewed the problem of the peasants' debts. For producer cooperatives only the debts accumulated before the agricultural year of 1982/83 are taken into account, for consumer and other cooperatives, before 1981/82 and for individual producers, debts accumulated before 1980/81. Benefits are granted to farms that have suffered from the activity of counterrevolutionaries and to peasants that have defended the revolution with arms in their hands.⁴⁴

As J. Wheelock stated, in the area of agrarian relations the Government of Nicaragua now faces the task of strengthening and further developing what has already been attained. The Government of Nicaragua tries to consolidate the increase of 10 percent in agricultural production with various social measures. At the same time, special attention will be paid to the development of the agricultural infrastructure, modernization of the technical base, rise in the level of the peasants' occupational habits and strengthening of the relationship between state and cooperative sectors.

Policy of Independence and Cooperation

After the victory of the revolution Nicaragua's international, including foreign economic, relations also underwent fundamental transformations. The country's government makes big efforts to diversify foreign trade and economic relations for the purpose of weakening the dependence on U.S. markets.

Although the share of the United States in Nicaragua's foreign trade decreased, nevertheless it remained high both in the country's export and import. For example, in 1982 the United States accounted for 22.6 percent of the Nicaraguan export (in 1981, 23.2 percent) and for 19 percent of the import (in 1981, 26.3 percent). At the same time, the proportion of the members of the Central American Common Market in Nicaraguan export declined from 21 percent in 1977 to 13.2 percent in 1982 and in import from 21.1 percent in 1981 to 15.1 percent in 1982. The share of the members of the European Economic Community in the country's export comprised 20.9 percent in 1982 (20.8 percent in 1981) and 16 percent in its import (14 percent in 1981).⁴⁵ Nicaragua's trade with Japan was activated considerably. According to the preliminary data of Nicaragua's Ministry of Foreign Trade Japan's share in the country's import rose to 8 percent in 1983.⁴⁶

The Government of Nicaragua attaches great importance to the strengthening of relations and development of cooperation with developing countries. For example, the volume of trade with Mexico is high. Trade relations with this state extend to more than 20 different spheres of Nicaragua's national economy. First of all, the import of Mexican petroleum, which is carried out within the framework of the Mexican-Venezuelan agreement on the deliveries of petroleum to the countries of Central America and the Caribbean Basin, occupies an important place. According to this agreement, whose effect was extended by another 4 years in July 1983, Mexico delivers 15,000 barrels of petroleum to Nicaragua every day.⁴⁷ On the whole, Mexico's share in Nicaragua's import rose from 12 percent in 1981 to 21.1 percent in 1982.⁴⁸

The Government of Nicaragua pays special attention to the development of cooperation with the USSR and other states of the socialist camp. In 1981 the share of CEMA members in Nicaragua's export comprised 5.6 percent and in 1982, 7.3 percent and in its import, 3.3 and 11.5 percent respectively.⁴⁹ Socialist countries sell machines, equipment, transport facilities, tractors, other agricultural machines, trucks and fertilizers to Nicaragua and buy traditional goods of Nicaraguan export, that is, coffee, raw sugar and cotton. Cooperation with CEMA members is of a multilateral nature and encompasses such important spheres of the economy as the exploitation of natural resources, power engineering, transport and means of communication.

Soviet-Nicaraguan cooperation was initiated in the course of the first visit of the party and government delegation of the Republic of Nicaragua to the USSR in March 1980. A trade agreement, agreements on technical-economic, cultural and scientific cooperation and on air communication, protocols on the deliveries of goods and on the establishment of trade representations and a consular convention were signed in Moscow at that time. The trade turnover between the Soviet Union and Nicaragua rose from 5.6 million rubles in 1980 to 10.4 million rubles in 1981. In 1982 it totaled 42.5 million rubles.⁵⁰

The successful development of economic-trade, scientific-technical and cultural relations between the USSR and Nicaragua was noted during the visit to the USSR of a state delegation of the Republic of Nicaragua headed by D. Ortega, member of the National Directorate of the FSLN, coordinator of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction, in May 1982. An intergovernment agreement on the further development of economic and technical cooperation, as well as protocols providing for the deliveries of machinery and equipment from the USSR to Nicaragua and assistance in the development of hydraulic power engineering, the mining industry, agriculture, communication and other sectors of the Nicaraguan economy, was signed in the course of negotiations.

Owing to the appearance of new trade partners, in 1983 Nicaragua succeeded in increasing the currency proceeds from the export of its traditional goods by 20 percent. For example, before the revolution 10 countries throughout the world were buyers of coffee--the basic item of Nicaragua's export--and at present Nicaragua sells coffee to more than 20 states. After the revolution socialist countries were the first to become its buyers. New markets for the sale of cotton, sugar and other goods appeared. Before the revolution the United States was the only market for the sale of sugar. In 1980-1982 Nicaragua sold 50 percent of all the exported sugar to the United States (31 percent to Mexico and 17 percent to the USSR). In May 1983 the United States adopted a decision on reducing its sugar purchases in Nicaragua by 90 percent, which signified the loss of a market for the sale of 53,000 tons of this product.⁵¹ However, Nicaragua's new foreign economic policy made it possible to solve this problem painlessly. An agreement with Algeria on the delivery of 80,000 tons of sugar to this country in 1983-84 and of another 120,000 tons in 1984-85 was signed. Nicaraguan sugar will be bought for the first time by Iran.

The expansion of the geography of economic relations is not only the basis for the growth of Nicaragua's export, but also an important component of the program for structural reorganization, which meets the tasks of advance in the country's economic potential and the provision of reliable markets for the growing volume of national output. During the difficult 5 years following the victory of the revolution the organic connection between the domestic and foreign economic policy pursued by the Government of Nicaragua justified itself fully and opened up new prospects for national reconstruction. The increase in the gross domestic product in 1983 attests to this. According to preliminary estimates it comprised 5 percent and was the highest in the region.⁵²

FOOTNOTES

1. See: LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 2, 1984, pp 81-85.
2. "Marco estratégico de la Reforma Agraria," Managua, 1981, p 16.
3. "Nicaragua in Revolution," New York, 1982, p 210.
4. "Programa de reactivación en beneficio del pueblo," Managua, 1980, p 68; "Programa económico de austeridad y eficiencia," Managua, 1981, pp 123 and 133.

5. "Programa económico de austeridad y eficiencia," pp 120 and 133.
6. "Inforpress centroamericana," Guatemala, 17 de febrero de 1983, N 530, p 11.
7. "Nicaragua in Revolution," p 228.
8. COMERCIO EXTERIOR, Mexico, N 4, 1981, p 412.
9. "El país que heredamos, que debemos defender y queremos construir," Managua, 1981, p 14.
10. "Habla la dirección de la Vanguardia," Managua, 1981, p 259.
11. "Programa económico de austeridad y eficiencia," p 20; QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, London, 1982, N 4, p 14.
12. "Programa económico de austeridad y eficiencia," p 43; PATRIA LIBRE, Managua, N 21, 1982, p 57.
13. "Inforpress centroamericana," 17 de febrero de 1983, N 530, p 11.
14. Calculated according to QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1983, N 4, p 5.
15. "Texto íntegro del Informe de la JGRN presentado por el Comandante de la Revolución Daniel Ortega ante el Consejo de Estado," Managua, mayo 1983, p 16.
16. "Inforpress centroamericana," 5 de mayo de 1983, N 540, p 9.
17. BARRICADA, 13.V.1982; 23.IX.1982.
18. GRANMA, La Habana, 1.IX.1983; NUEVO DIARIO, 25.IX.1983.
19. ENVIO, Managua, 1983, N 24, p 12.
20. ENVIO, 1982, N 12, p 13.
21. ENVIO, 1983, N 24, p 11.
22. BARRICADA INTERNACIONAL, 9.V.1983; "Programa económico de austeridad y eficiencia," p 66.
23. NUEVO DIARIO, 10.I.1983.
24. BARRICADA INTERNACIONAL, 27.VI.1983.
25. BARRICADA, 17.IX.1982.
26. QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1983, N 1, p 5.

27. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', 1983, No 11, p 17.
28. BARRICADA, 16.I.1984.
29. "Todas las armas del pueblo para defender las conquistas de la Revolución. Discurso del Cmdte D. Ortega el 19 de julio de 1983," Managua, 1982, p 3.
30. "Nicaragua 79/82. Realizaciones estatales en 3 años de Revolución," Managua, 1982, p 27.
31. J. Wheelock Roman, "El gran desafío," Managua, 1983, p 86.
32. Source: "Informe de la misión especial de programación a Nicaragua," Roma, 1980, p 84.
33. LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, California, 1981, N 2, p 56.
34. "Informe de la misión especial de programación a Nicaragua," p 111 (XIII).
35. Ibid, p 113.
36. "Nicaragua hoy," Managua, 1981, N 2, p. F.
37. "Ley Reforma Agraria," Managua, 1981.
38. "America Latina. Informe de Mercados," 28 de agosto de 1981, p 020.
39. BARRICADA, 19.XII.1983.
40. BARRICADA, 20.I.1984.
41. BARRICADA INTERNACIONAL, 27.VI.1983.
42. BARRICADA INTERNACIONAL, 16.X.1981.
43. "Texto integro...", p 4.
44. BARRICADA, 20.VII.1983.
45. ENVIO, N 24, 1983, p 10.
46. BARRICADA, 15.VI.1983.
47. FINANCIAL TIMES, London, 5.IX.1983.
48. "Texto integro...", p 8.
49. Ibidem.
50. "Vneshnyaya trgovlya SSSR v 1981 g." /USSR Foreign Trade in 1981/, Moscow, 1982, p 268; "Vneshnyaya trgovlya SSSR v 1982 g.," Moscow, 1983, pp 269-270.

51. GRANMA, 27.V.1983.

52. BARRICADA, 23.I.1984.

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INTERNATIONAL

U.S. CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY OPPOSED TO 'PEACE-LOVING' NICARAGUA

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 84 pp 48-57

/Article by I. M. Bulychev: "In the Struggle for Peace and National Sovereignty"

/Text The process of socioeconomic and political reforms in Nicaragua is inseparable from the struggle of the people of this country for peace and security in Central America. From the first days after the victory of the revolution the Government of Nicaragua has purposefully and systematically engaged in the search for ways of a peaceful solution of disputable problems mutually acceptable for all the states of this region and has constantly participated in setting up the process of consultations and negotiations among interested parties in order to block the way for the further increase in tension in Central America and to rule out the possibility of transforming the region into a zone of military actions.

The peace-loving Central American course of new Nicaragua has become an integral part of its foreign policy, which is based on the principle of active participation in the nonaligned movement and the striving for the development of equitable and friendly relations with all states respecting the right of nations to self-determination and independent development. The fundamental position of Nicaragua and the readiness of the Government of National Reconstruction for the maximum utilization of all practical possibilities for the preservation of peace in Central America have received wide international approval and contribute to a rise in the country's prestige at the world arena.

The policy of the Reagan Administration, which pursues the course of solving problems in Central America by force, opposes this process. The buildup in the military presence of the United States in this region, expansion of the assistance to Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries and transformation of Honduras into the main base of subversive activities against the Sandinista revolution have led to a serious aggravation of the situation in the region and make the threat of emergence of an international focus of military actions in Central America a real one. In accordance with Washington's plan aimed at the escalation of the armed conflict in the region the so-called Central American Democratic Community was established in January 1982. M. D'Escoto, Nicaragua's minister of foreign affairs, justly called it a "new destabilizing factor contributing to the intensification of the disconnection, not unification, of Central American states."

Speaking at the meeting of the UN Security Council in March 1982, Daniel Ortega, member of the National Directorate of the Sandinista National Liberation Front and coordinator of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction, appealed to all countries to help the region's peace-loving forces and to prevent the outbreak of a fratricidal war inflamed by the White House on the pretext of the so-called "penetration of international communism" into Central America. D. Ortega also pointed out that Washington's intention to further consider Nicaragua or some other country of Central America and the Caribbean Basin a "geopolitical reserve of the United States," or part of its "strategic borders," was hidden behind this. He noted correctly that this contradicted the principles of international law and was a gross violation of the UN Charter. D. Ortega again declared Nicaragua's readiness for negotiations with the U.S. Government and other interested parties in order "to urgently sign nonaggression treaties" and thus to guarantee peace and internal stability in the region.

However, the next peaceful initiative, like all the subsequent ones, was left unanswered. Conversely, the Reagan Administration, simultaneously with the intensification of the economic blockade and military pressure on revolutionary Nicaragua, sped up the organization of a reactionary military-political alliance aimed against the Sandinista revolution. In October 1982 the United States made a new attempt to attain Nicaragua's political and diplomatic isolation. The formation of a new organization--Forum for Peace and Democracy--was announced at a conference convened under Washington's pressure in San Jose (Costa Rica). According to the intentions of its initiators, this organization together with the Central American Democratic Community should become an additional "collective" tool for the realization of Reagan's Central American policy.

Demonstrating convincingly that the establishment of such "forums" is none other than new maneuvers of American imperialism aimed at a disruption in the process of political settlement of the situation in Central America, the Government of Nicaragua does not stop the search for ways of alleviating zonal tension and promotes in every possible way the creation of favorable conditions for a peaceful solution of complex regional problems. In this connection it pays special attention to the normalization of relations with its direct neighbors, primarily Honduras. For example, proceeding from the understanding on the need to resolve all disputable matters through direct negotiations reached at the meeting in El Guasale in May 1981, at the meeting with E. Paz Barnica, secretary of state for foreign affairs of Honduras, held in Tegucigalpa in April 1982 M. D'Escoto proposed a detailed plan for the normalization of Nicaraguan-Honduran relations. All the seven points of this plan opened up realistic possibilities for the elimination of tension in the region of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border and in the relations between the two countries. In particular, one of its central points urged the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty. As a supplement to this initiative in August 1982 D. Ortega sent a message to R. Suazo Cordova, president of Honduras, in which he proposed the holding of a conference on a higher level with the participation of the commanders-in-chief of the armies of the two parties.

Undoubtedly, the realization of these peaceful Nicaraguan initiatives alone could greatly improve the situation in the entire region. However, the subsequent development of events showed that the ruling circles of Honduras and its

military clique headed by Gen G. Alvarez tried to use the dialogue with Nicaragua for the disinformation of the international community, as a cover for building up its military power. The book "Nicaragua razoblachayet" /Nicaragua Exposes/ prepared by Nicaragua's Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents documentary evidence of this policy of Honduran authorities. The numerous facts cited in it fully expose the ruling circles of Honduras both as unwilling to promote the search for mutually acceptable ways for the elimination of tension in the relations between the two countries and as attempting to become the regional "center" of power. "It appears," M. D'Escobar stated in this connection, "that the Reagan Administration is interested in transforming Honduras into Central American Israel."

Utilizing the regional ambitions of the ruling circles of Honduras, Washington, in fact, has transformed this country into a base for the preparation and implementation of the plans for stifling the Sandinista revolution worked out by the American Administration. From the end of 1982 until the present, armed formations of Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries trained by the CIA and the Pentagon have been constantly invading the territory of Nicaragua from Honduras. Their criminal operations are protected by the mortar and artillery fire of Honduran subdivisions. Regular large-scale American-Honduran maneuvers, Big Pine 2, took place on the territory of Honduras from August 1983 until February 1984. Methods of landing troops and capturing a bridgehead in immediate proximity to the Nicaraguan border were developed with the participation of U.S. marines in the course of these maneuvers, in particular at the concluding stage. The performance of new Big Pine 3 maneuvers is envisaged for June 1984. The participation of the armed forces of El Salvador and Guatemala along with the Honduran army in them is planned. All this, as well as the establishment of a regional military training center in Puerto-Castilla on the territory of Honduras in June 1983 and the revival of the military bloc--Central American Defense Council--at the beginning of October 1983, greatly increased the tension in all Central America.

At the urgent meeting of the UN Security Council convened at the request of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction in February 1984 the representative of Nicaragua exposed the criminal nature of these actions. At the same time, attention was drawn to the fact that the participation of the regular units of the Honduran army in actions hostile to Nicaragua took on an ever more open nature recently. In fact, the Honduran military clique was transformed into an obedient tool of Washington's aggressive policy in Central America. It becomes clear that the Reagan Administration, using demagogic statements on peace and democracy as a cover, tries to provoke an armed conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras. Then, in accordance with the Pentagon's plan, it intends to involve the armies of other members of the Central American Defense Council in this conflict and to expand it to the scale of a regional war.

Taking into consideration the complexity of the situation resulting from the raising by the United States of international terrorism to the rank of regional policy, the Government of Nicaragua persistently continues the policy of development of the process of mutual consultations and meetings with the leaders of the Latin American states that do not accept the Washington "version" of the solution of Central American problems. With the formation in June 1982 of the

Mixed Nicaraguan-Costa Rican Commission such consultations between Nicaragua and, for example, neighboring Costa Rica acquired a stable nature. Thus, at the beginning of May--after two intergovernmental meetings in April--a delegation of deputies of the legislative assembly of Costa Rica visited Nicaragua. The joint Nicaraguan-Costa Rican communique adopted at the end of the visit paid special attention to the importance of the dialogues and meetings held on the basis of mutual respect and equality of rights, which were the "correct way to the solution of problems arising in relations among states."

In this document both parties expressed their sincere intention to follow, when solving the region's problems and in bilateral relations, the principles of the UN Charter and the provisions of international law, to observe, in particular, the principle of "nonintervention in the internal affairs of states" and to respect the "right of nations to self-determination." The part of the communique stressing the need not to resort to the use of force or to the threats of its application in international relations and to strictly adhere to the principle of "respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of states" is especially important under the conditions of existing tension in Central America. The parties also spoke in favor of a "peaceful resolution of interstate differences."

The parliamentary delegation of Costa Rica declared its support for the "principle of Costa Rica's active neutrality as the basis for its just relations with neighboring states." In turn, the Commission on Foreign Affairs of the State Council of the Republic of Nicaragua stressed the legality of the "right of the Nicaraguan revolution to protection against foreign aggression by all the means available to it." The exchange of views contributed to the refinement of the positions of the parties on various aspects of bilateral relations and in the evaluation of the situation in Central America. Subsequent meetings confirmed the substantiation of the joint proposal on the advisability of the establishment and transformation of the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican Commission into a permanent organ.

Of course, such a course of development of Nicaraguan-Costa Rican relations evoked the unconcealed irritation of the White House and the activation of reactionary groupings in Costa Rica itself. In particular, this was discussed at a meeting between Tomas Borge, member of the National Directorate of the FSLN, Nicaragua's minister of interior, and Angel Edmundo Solano, Costa Rica's minister of public security. The latter, speaking before journalists, confirmed that there were forces interested in the deterioration of relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua and in stirring up military actions in all Central America. Curtin Winsor, U.S. ambassador to Costa Rica, plays a special role in this. He exerts constant pressure on the government and openly intervenes in the internal affairs of this sovereign state. The ambassador's anti-Nicaraguan position finds support among members of the influential organization of business circles--the Costa Rican Institute of the Enterprising Sector (INCOSEM). To a considerable extent owing to this, in September 1983 the armed detachments of the counterrevolutionary organization "Democratic Revolutionary Alliance" carried out from the territory of Costa Rica a gangster raid on the Nicaraguan customs point in Penas Blancas. Even earlier this organization of Nicaraguan renegades declared its involvement in the criminal bombing of the international

airport in Managua and a number of government buildings. In response to the note of Nicaragua's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with these gross violations of the provisions of international law Costa Rica's reactionary forces spread a campaign of slander against the Sandinista revolution in the press, trying to disrupt the process of normalization of relations between these two countries.

It is quite obvious that such actions, as well as the very fact of presence of subversive forces hostile to the Nicaraguan people on the territory of Costa Rica, represent some of the elements of the Central American policy of the Reagan Administration and carry the danger of transformation of the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border into a new focus of regional tension, which fundamentally opposes the true interests of the people of these two countries and all Central America.

Therefore, the proclamation in November 1983 by President L. Alberto Monge of the course of a constant observance of the policy of Costa Rica's active neutrality was received with great satisfaction in Nicaragua. The Government of Nicaragua considered this act envisaging the prohibition of the use of the territory of Central American countries as bases for aggression against any state in the region and the placement of foreign military groups as an important constructive step on the path to normalization of bilateral relations and improvement in the situation in the region as a whole. The official statement by the Republic of Nicaragua published on 17 November 1983 expressed confidence that the "neutrality of Costa Rica and the rights and duties resulting from this will serve the cause of peace." Problems concerning the regulation of the situation in the border zone on the basis of jointly developed measures were in the center of attention of the sixth conference of the Mixed Nicaraguan Costa-Rican Commission held in Managua at the beginning of January 1984.

At the same time, certain difficulties arise in the course of its work. On the pretext of border "disturbances," which arose in February 1984 as a result of the actions of Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, the reactionary circles of Costa Rica demanded the cessation of the activity of the mixed commission. Their attempts to begin the process of the country's militarization were activated. Reports on Pentagon's intention to establish a number of military-engineering facilities and so forth in the region of the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border appeared in the Central American press. All this unequivocally points to the new plans of the Reagan Administration to intensify military pressure on Nicaragua.

The efficiency of the peace loving course aimed at a political settlement of the Central American crisis was manifested especially clearly in the position of the leadership of Nicaragua with respect to the activity of members of the Contadora group established in January 1983 on the initiative of the governments of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama for the purpose of searching for mutually acceptable political solutions and preventing the danger of outbreak of a regional military conflict. Nicaragua often supported the realistic and constructive proposals by this group and made a considerable contribution to the development of its most important initiatives.

Rejecting the attempts by the Reagan Administration and its local allies to present the Central American crisis as a consequence of the intensification of the "confrontation between the East and West," on 19 July 1983 the Government

of Nicaragua came out with an important, new initiative: At a public meeting attended by many thousands of people in Leon, D. Ortega announced Nicaragua's consent to begin the negotiations on a political settlement of the regional crisis under the auspices of the Contadora group with due regard for the positive proposals of the Can-Cun Declaration adopted by the presidents of the members of this group at the conference in Can-Cun (Mexico) on 17-18 July 1983.

At the same time, the leadership of Nicaragua put forward a specific program for an urgent discussion of the key aspects of the situation in Central America. This program envisages the following: To put an end to the military confrontation in the region through an immediate conclusion of a nonaggression treaty between Nicaragua and Honduras; to stop all arms deliveries to the warring parties in El Salvador so that the people of this country may be able to solve their internal problems by themselves; to reject all military assistance in the form of arms deliveries, training and use of territory for aggression on the part of forces hostile to any Central American country; to strictly respect the rights of Central American people to self-determination and nonintervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states; to put an end to economic discrimination with respect to any state in the region; not to place foreign military bases and not to conduct military maneuvers with the participation of foreign armies on the territory of Central America.

These clear, unequivocal proposals by the Government of Nicaragua were highly assessed by the members of the Contadora group as well as a number of other countries in Latin America and Western Europe. The decision of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction to ratify the document worked out at the September (1983) conference of ministries of foreign affairs of the members of the Contadora group which contains specific proposals on stopping the arms race in Central America and other countries, received the same assessment.

These and other measures reflecting the profound interest in the political solution of the regional crisis create a Latin American vacuum around the United States and sharply weaken the international factor in Reagan's Central American policy. In such an atmosphere the American Administration speeds up the realization of CIA plans aimed at the capture by Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries of the base on the territory of Nicaragua and the establishment of a "provisional" government there. Under these conditions the Government of Nicaragua was again forced to appeal to the world community to prevent the spread of military actions in Central America. At its request the matter of the "situation in Central America: threat to international peace and security and peaceful initiatives" was included in the agenda of the 38th session of the UN General Assembly.

Speaking at this session, D. Ortega exposed the hypocritical essence of Reagan's statements on the striving by the United States to establish peace in Central America. He cited weighty evidence of the fact that from January 1981 the Reagan Administration waged a true war against Nicaragua. "We again repeat," he stressed, "that the United States should withdraw its armed forces from the region and give up its aggressive policy. It is necessary to reach agreements, which would guarantee the security of the region's states. It is necessary to put an end to the participation of Honduras in aggression against Nicaragua..."

Having shown the groundlessness of the assertions by the Reagan Administration that Nicaragua allegedly represented a threat to the security of the region's countries, D. Ortega stated the following: "Nicaragua creates its own democracy and to solve the problem of the type of internal system and democracy is our sovereign right, the right of the Nicaraguan people, which is not the subject of negotiations and is not discussed. It should be respected." Next he called upon the world community to give its utmost support to the Nicaraguan people in asserting this sovereign right.

The interventionist course of the Reagan Administration against Nicaragua was condemned by most delegations participating in the 38th session of the UN General Assembly as an open violation of the provisions of international law contradictory to the charter of this organization and as an encroachment on the sovereignty and independence of the people of this region. The overwhelming majority of UN members also supported the constructive proposals by Nicaragua and the Contadora group, which continues intensive work on the preparation of a platform for an efficient regulation of the situation in Central America.

In this connection it is important to dwell on the drafts of three treaties and one agreement worked out by Nicaragua's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which are to contribute to the realization of the basic provisions of the "document of objectives" adopted by the Contadora group. The drafts envisaged the conclusion of nonaggression pacts between the United States and Nicaragua and between Honduras and Nicaragua and the signing of a multilateral treaty with the participation of all five Central American states and of an agreement on the political settlement of the Salvadoran crisis. The content of these documents is subject to one objective--a peaceful settlement of Central American problems.

Nicaragua's proposals were highly assessed by UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar, who stated that there were no justifications for military actions in Central America and urged all interested parties "to contribute to the solution of problems of Central America in a regional context and by peaceful means without outside intervention."

Encountering support on the part of the representatives of progressive and democratic circles of Latin America and the world community, the peace-loving initiatives of the Government of National Reconstruction of the Republic of Nicaragua constantly run across the tough obstructionist position of the Reagan Administration. The White House not only rejects Nicaragua's proposals on the normalization of the situation in Central America, but also continues the policy of threats, terrorism and organization of provocations against the Nicaraguan people. At the same time, Washington tries to create a semblance of interest and cooperation in the search for ways of solving problems in Central America. This is precisely how the institution of the post of special representative of the U.S. president for Central America (at first Richard Stone and now Shlaudeman) and then the establishment of a bipartisan National Commission for Central America headed by Kissinger should be viewed.

The commission's report approved by President Reagan in January 1984, which contains urgent recommendations for the further increase in the military presence in Central America and in appropriations for military assistance for the

antipopular regimes of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, leaves no doubts as to the true purpose of this commission. "Kissinger's report," D. Ortega stressed, "represents part of the propaganda efforts of the present American Administration for the purpose of justifying the aggressive policy in Latin America, especially in Central America."

It is also doubtless that the activity of the mentioned commission is to neutralize the efforts of the Contadora group, if possible, to undermine the unity formed within this group and to again impose on the countries forming part of it a solution of regional problems alien to them.

Despite the intrigues of American imperialism Nicaragua's peace-loving position meets with approval and understanding in Latin America and far beyond its borders. The trips of the Nicaraguan delegation headed by D. Ortega to a number of countries throughout the continent and its participation in the festive ceremony of assumption of the post of president of Argentina by Raul Alfonsin in the middle of December 1983 took the form of a striking demonstration of support for the efforts of Nicaragua and the Contadora group. "We are confident," D. Ortega stated after a talk with R. Alfonsin, "that we will find every possible support on the part of the Argentine Government and people in the fight for peace."

In the course of the visit to Argentina D. Ortega held meetings with the presidents of Costa Rica and Guatemala, at which Nicaragua's readiness for an all-around discussion of the possible ways of a peaceful settlement of the situation in Central America and for a joint development of efficient measures to prevent the emergence of a focus of military actions in this region was stressed once again. Nicaragua's position with respect to the political solution of the Central American crisis was also set forth in detail during his visit to Venezuela and during the talks held with Jaime Lusinchi, the new president of this country, and other prominent statesmen.

The persistence with which Nicaragua seeks to create an atmosphere of mutual trust in the region is reinforced by the specific proposals of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction on setting up economic cooperation and developing relations with the regions' countries both on a bilateral and multilateral basis. In this respect Nicaragua actively promotes the revival of the process of Central American economic integration and the transformation of the Central American Common Market into a well-adjusted and reliable mechanism meeting the true interests of states and nations in the regions' countries and promoting the overcoming of economic independence and backwardness and the acceleration of social progress. "Nicaragua mobilizes all possible efforts to promote peace and economic cooperation in Central America," S. Ramirez, member of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction, stated, "and if we exhaust all these efforts, we will seek other opportunities until we find the peaceful solution necessary for the region, which undergoes a political and economic crisis."

Nicaragua confronts the policy of isolationism and organization of reactionary antipopular blocs with revolutionary firmness in the fight for the elimination of the threat of war and political stability in the region and a course of development of all-around relations on the basis of respect for the principles of

nonintervention, self-determination, territorial integrity and equality of rights. This line has been implemented systematically during all the 5 years that have passed from the day of victory of the Sandinista people's revolution.

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INTERNATIONAL

LATIN AMERICA IN MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS

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/Article by N. G. Zaytsev/

/Excerpts/ Reasons for Use of Multilateral Negotiations

Among the factors prompting the Latin American region to actively use means of negotiation in the 1960's and, in particular, 1970's, first of all, the striving to subordinate foreign economic relations to the tasks of overcoming backwardness should be singled out. Intensification of the role of the external factor in economic strategy for a specific period helped the region's states to maintain sufficiently high rates of growth, that is, 6.1 percent in 1961-1974 and 5.2 percent in 1975-1980.² At the same time, during the 1970's the region's dependence on foreign trade increased. The coefficient of export rose to 12 percent and of import, to 13 percent,³ which led to the emergence of serious, new problems. In particular, as a result of the rise in the prices of energy resources and finished articles, which in totality account for about 80 percent of the regional import,⁴ it was not possible to ensure further economic advance through an increase in export. To maintain the rates of economic growth, Latin American governments widely enlisted (on the average, about 20 billion dollars annually in 1974-1979) foreign resources borrowed mainly (85 percent in 1979) from private sources.⁵ However, the results of this policy, which at first was encouraged in every possible way by transnational banks interested in ensuring the recycling of petrodollars, turned out to be more than deplorable.

The transfers of the profits of transnational corporations abroad and debt service payments form the basis for a sharp increase in the deficit of the balance of payments for current operations, which in Latin American countries--nonoil exporters--in the 1970's comprised 3.3 percent of the gross domestic product as compared to 1.9 percent during the preceding decade.⁶ According to the estimate given in the Program of Actions of Latin America for the 1980's adopted at the 19th session of ECLA /Economic Commission for Latin America/ (1981, Montevideo), a substantial part of the import, foreign financing and technological innovations passed through the channels of transnational corporations, which formed the basis for the imbalance and dependence of many Latin American economies.⁷

The most difficult situation was created in the early 1980's. As the leaders of ECLA believe, the following are the basic reasons for the "import" of the crisis in the region: a sharp drop in the prices of raw material export goods

(in 1981-1982 in real terms they were at the lowest level since the 1930's), high interest rates on credit and a sharp reduction--consequence of the lower level of international liquidity and the high foreign debts of Latin American countries (according to the ECLA estimate, about 310 billion dollars at the end of 1983)--in the influx of both private and state financial resources into Latin America. Pointing out at the sixth session of the UNCTAD that in 1982 about 40 percent of the export proceeds were spent only on the payment of interest on debts and in some countries these payments reached an unprecedented level, that is, about 10 percent of the gross domestic product, E. Iglesias, executive secretary of the ECLA, stated the following: "It seems that there is a paradox, as a result of which Latin America can be fully transformed into a 'pure exporter' of capital."⁸

Aggravation of foreign economic difficulties in combination with the unsolved internal economic problems arising in the course of "growth without development" led to a slowdown in the increase in the gross domestic product to 1.5 percent in 1981 and then to its absolute decrease of 0.9 percent in 1982 and 3.3 percent in 1983. In Latin America the per-capita gross domestic product was reduced by 1 percent in 1981, 3.3 percent in 1982 and 5.6 percent in 1983, As a result, the region was thrust back to the 1977 level.⁹

Such a situation largely explains the increasingly persistent attempts by Latin American governments to find at least a partial solution of the problems facing them within the framework of international economic organizations. The community of the economic problems that have arisen is the basis for joint actions within the framework of multilateral economic negotiations.

The striving to use the collective "negotiation potential," which demonstrated its effectiveness in the course of the first session of the UNCTAD, is another important motive for the participation of Latin American countries in the work of international organizations and forums. Therefore, it was not accidental that the "77 joint declaration" proclaimed at that time stated the following: "Developing countries are firmly convinced that there is a vital need to preserve and further strengthen unity in the future. It is an obligatory tool for ensuring and adopting new approaches and new positions in the field of the world economy."¹⁰

The results of almost 20 years of international negotiation activity in economic problems showed that at all major forums developing countries adopted joint positions. At the same time, the increase in the activity of Latin America in international economic organizations and negotiations is connected primarily with the striving to utilize their mechanisms in the interests of development of regional economic cooperation.¹¹ Under the conditions of insufficient development of the inter-Latin-American economic structure the establishment of regional economic organizations of both integration and nonintegration types is an important means of promoting this cooperation. For this purpose within the framework of the "Group of 77" Latin American countries participate in the development of economic cooperation among developing countries. Such a type of negotiation activity plays an important role in a number of organizations of the UN system, primarily in the UNCTAD.

The fact that within the framework of these organizations Latin American and other developing countries are not isolated should not be forgotten. As D. Castellanos, one of the directors of the secretariat of LAES /Latin American Economic System/, former permanent representative of Venezuela at international organizations in Geneva, noted, the socialist camp gives "special political support to developing countries."

As the examples of major international economic conferences of recent years have shown, the positions of some Western states with respect to the proposals of the "Group of 77" are by no means always common. In the last few years the United States, as well as the FRG, England and Japan, has followed the toughest line, whereas the Scandinavian, as well as some other West European, countries, for example, France, Greece, Holland and Spain, have held a more "moderate" position. As a result, in some cases they sometimes break their "group discipline" and support certain proposals by the "Group of 77."

Basic Elements of the Regional Approach

Each of the international economic organizations or conferences, in which Latin American countries participate, faces tasks outlined by the appropriate mandate. This predetermines both the specific nature of preparation and the formulation of positions. At the same time, it is possible to single out the basic elements, quite stable in recent years, in the approach of Latin American countries to the central aspects of reorganization of international economic relations, with which the region's states come out in the course of multilateral negotiations.¹⁷

First of all, the general evaluation of the state of the world economy and international economic relations is stable. It is substantiated not so much by the cyclical nature of the crisis as by its structural nature. In connection with this it is pointed out that the crisis cannot be overcome by the adoption of one-sided measures. On the basis of the increased mutual dependence in the world economy Latin American governments believe that the international community should develop a program of coordinated measures for the purpose of overcoming the crisis and changing over to the reorganization of international economic relations and the establishment of the new international economic order. The holding within the framework of the United Nations of global negotiations on the basic problems of world economic development should play an important role in the attainment of these goals.¹⁸

Problems concerning international trade in raw material goods represent another basic element of the Latin American approach. In this connection urgent measures are to be taken to attain stable prices of raw materials and to ensure greater participation of developing countries in the processing, marketing, distribution and transportation of raw material goods. To implement them, the following requirements are made: for an efficient realization of the Integrated Raw Material Program,¹⁹ including the conclusion of new trade agreements; for the most rapid commissioning of the mechanism of the common fund; for the expansion and facilitation of the access of developing countries to the mechanism of compensation financing of the International Monetary Fund; for the strengthening of existing and establishment of new associations of producers of raw material goods; for the development of a joint regional program for the marketing and distribution of raw materials and for actions connected with the problems of export of raw materials coordinated by the LAES.

Latin American countries believe that in matters of trade policy and trade in finished goods the existing world trade system is unable to come through the present crisis. Existing customs coordinated in the multilateral trade negotiations do not correspond to this either.²⁰ The discriminatory status of the developing world is even more aggravated by the fact that some developed capitalist countries resort to the use of additional coercive trade measures. In the opinion of Latin American governments, proper attention should be paid to the examination in the UNCTAD of the problem of improvement in the existing trade system, including its rules and principles, and to preserve and improve the general system of preferences with due regard for the developing countries.²¹

The present difficulties of developing countries are most closely connected with the structural flaws of the existing international currency and financial system, in whose management they hardly participate. In this connection, in the opinion of Latin American governments, it is necessary to take urgent measures to improve the mechanism of activity of the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and regional banks for development, as well as measures to facilitate the debt burden and to improve borrowing terms based on agreements on restructuring debts, lengthier preferential periods and dates of payments, lower interest rates and so forth.

In matters of industrialization and structural reorganization of the economy the demand for the establishment of an efficient, new international division of labor is also characteristic for Latin America. For this, the region's countries insist, it is important to hold consultations on individual sectors of industry under the auspices of the UNIDO /UN Industrial Development Organization/ and in cooperation with the LAES and to determine joint actions aimed at a structural reorganization of the world industry.

In the area of technological transfer Latin American states urgently appeal for the conclusion of negotiations on an agreement within the framework of the UNCTAD on the code of behavior in the area of technological transfer, as well as for the beginning of development of a strategy of technological transformation of the economy of the developing world.

The governments of Latin American countries constantly participate in the discussions of the code of behavior of transnational corporations. Their position is as follows: Transnational corporations should be subject to the legislation of the receiving country, refrain from intervention in the internal affairs of the states where they operate, as well as in the relations of the receiving country with other states, not act as a tool of foreign policy of another state, be subject to the policy, goals and national priorities of development and promote their realization, give the necessary information on their activity to the government of the receiving country, contribute to the development of the scientific and technical potential of receiving countries and refrain from the use of a restrictive business practice.

Economic cooperation among developing countries is an important part of the regional strategy. For Latin America economic cooperation among developing countries is the cornerstone in the reconstruction of international economic relations and an important factor in the revival of the world economy. In order to

strengthen the joint positions of developing countries in the context of north-south relations, it is necessary, from the point of view of Latin American states, to fulfill the Caracas Program of Actions for the Development of Economic Cooperation Among Developing Countries in a full volume and to pay special attention to the establishment of a global system of trade preferences among developing countries as an effective means of trade development.

In the last few years in the region's approach to problems of international economic cooperation and development there have been certain changes connected with the aggravation of the international political situation, including in Latin America, as a result of U.S. policy in Central America and the Caribbean Basin, which is reflected in the unprecedented deterioration in the region's economic situation. Concern for the fate of the world has been heard ever more frequently in the decisions of economic conferences. Thus, in the Quito Declaration leaders of Latin American countries state the following: "We confirm our appeal for disarmament, which would make it possible to redirect resources used for the arms race for purposes that would contribute to the development of all nations throughout the world. Problems of peace and development have a significant interconnection, because without peace it is impossible to attain development and without development peace will always be fragile."²² Formulations close in meaning are also contained in other program documents; for example, in the concluding materials of the Latin American preparatory conference for the UNCTAD-VI (February 1983) and in the Managua Communique on the results of the conference of ministers of nonaligned countries on Latin American problems (January 1983). The same topics were heard with full force in the Buenos Aires Platform, as well as in the course of speeches by many Latin American and other developing countries at the UNCTAD-VI.

A number of important innovations in the position of Latin American countries are the responses to the attempts by the United States to reduce the access of Latin American goods, primarily finished products, to its domestic market on the basis of a legislative confirmation of the principles of "gradation" and "selectivity" and to apply discriminatory economic measures against individual countries in the region. This was very firmly stated both in the above-mentioned document of the Cartagena Conference and in the Quito Declaration. Latin American countries try to consolidate their position in documents of the international community. In particular, at the sixth session of the UNCTAD, on the initiative of Nicaragua, which is the object of undisguised economic aggression on the part of the United States, the "Group of 77" presented an exceptionally important resolution "renunciation of coercive economic measures." This resolution, adopted despite the resistance of most Western countries, especially notes that "all developed countries should refrain from the use of trade restrictions, blockades, embargoes and other economic sanctions, which are incompatible with the provisions of the UN Charter."²³

Regional anticrisis policy has been a new important direction in the collective economic diplomacy of Latin America in recent years. At all major international economic forums in 1982-1984 its delegates expressed deep concern for the situation in the region's economy and tried to attain a joint approach by the international community to the solution of existing problems. Latin American countries took such positions at the sessions of the UN General Assembly, the

session of the GATT, (November 1982), sessions of the International Monetary Fund in 1982 and 1983 and of the Organization of American States, as well as in the course of the preparation for and holding of the UNCTAD-VI. However, the indicated international forums could not develop an integral program for the policy of developing countries on overcoming the crisis. The main reason for this was the obstructionist policy of Western countries, primarily the United States which openly stated that the world community had no need to make purposeful efforts to overcome the crisis and to help the developing world, because the "revival" that began in a number of leading Western countries through the "driving belt" of world trade would also contribute to economic growth at the periphery of the capitalist world economy.²⁴

Under these conditions Latin America undertakes new actions for the purpose of searching for ways out of the crisis. The detailed document "Basis for Latin America's Response to the International Economic Crisis" was their integral part.²⁵ It gave a comprehensive description of the basic manifestations of the crisis in the region, showed the uneven distribution of the burden of the crisis and formulated important proposals for overcoming foreign debts, developing intraregional cooperation and combining regional efforts for the solution of foreign trade problems and search for new ways of development in Latin America.

The proposals by ECLA and LAES directors formed the basis for the conference of prominent Latin American economists held in May 1983 (under ECLA auspices in Bogota) and the conference of representatives of heads of states or governments of Latin American countries held in August 1983 (under ECLA and LAES auspices in Santo Domingo), at which an agreement in principle on convening and the preliminary agenda of a Latin American economic conference at a higher level was reached.²⁶

The conference was held in Quito from 5 through 13 January 1984, including on 12 to 13 January, at the level of heads of states or their plenipotentiaries. The analytic document "Basis for Actions by Latin American Countries in Connection With the International Economic Crisis" was in the center of discussion. As a result, the Quito Declaration and the plan for joint actions for overcoming the consequences of the crisis, which pointed out the practical recommendations for the development of economic integration, solution of financing problems, expansion of intraregional trade and cooperation in the field of power engineering and the population's provision with food, were adopted.

The Quito Declaration gives a political evaluation of the present situation in the economy of Latin America. "The crisis," it notes, "is caused by internal and external factors and the latter to a significant extent are beyond the control of our countries and seriously limit our possibilities to overcome it."²⁷

In this connection an urgent need to adopt measures aimed at a reform of the international currency and financial system, as well as to change the currency and tax policy of developed capitalist states, primarily by lowering interest rates, eliminating protectionist barriers and stabilizing the prices of raw material goods exported by the region's countries, is noted. Among the measures to overcome the crisis the Quito Declaration singles out the need to combine national efforts and to strengthen regional integration and cooperation. The need to strengthen unity and cooperation with other members of the "Group of 77" is stressed.

Evidently, it is still premature to evaluate the real effect of the conference in Quito on overcoming the economic crisis experienced by the region. At the same time, right now it can be stated that this conference appears as a long-term orientation toward a more active utilization of joint regional actions, not in the form of a single action.

The coincidence of the positions of Latin America with the program documents of the "Group of 77," primarily with the Arusha Program (1979) and the Buenos Aires Platform (1983) worked out with the active assistance of the LAES, points to the community of economic interests of developing countries. However, the above-stated does not remove the problem of the existence of considerable divergences in the approaches of individual regional groups of the developing world. In these divergences it is impossible not to see some elements of inconsistency, which are due to a significant extent to differences in the levels of economic development.

Nor is the present program of actions of Latin American countries developed in recent years devoid of such shortcomings. On the one hand, it is directed toward the intensification of the collective counteraction to the crisis. On the other, it takes more into consideration the characteristics of its effect on the region's economy. However, a greater "mutual dependence" with the West is the chief thing. This contradiction is inherent in the very essence of the regional approach to the problem of reorganization of international relations, which is manifested in the course of multilateral negotiations. At the fifth and sixth sessions of the UNCTAD, when this problem was discussed, the question of the importance of the development of trade relations among countries with different social and political systems was raised. As is well known, it was impossible to reach an agreement on the solution of this problem mainly owing to the obstructionist position of the West. However, some Latin American countries addressing a number of unjustified demands at the socialist camp also bear a share of the responsibility.

How to evaluate the almost 20-year result of Latin America's participation in multilateral agreements on problems concerning the development and reorganization of international economic relations, including the last 10 years, in the context of the fight for the new international economic order? It is impossible to answer this question unequivocally. The past years were a period of both hopes and disappointments in connection with the possibilities and efficiency of utilization of the international negotiation mechanism. There is no doubt that throughout the negotiations on the problems of the new international economic order Latin American countries and the "Group of 77" as a whole succeeded in formulating a detailed and sufficiently reasoned position on its different aspects, although the elements of this position are not free of shortcomings.²⁸ However, the very fact that Latin America and other developing countries have a stable and, at the same time, internally mobile program and their own conceptual base for actions undoubtedly can be viewed positively.

This is also confirmed by some advances of Latin American countries attained in international economic negotiations. In regional terms they include the improvement in LAES and ECLA activity. In interregional terms this is the

establishment of cooperation between Latin America and developing countries in Asia and Africa both along the line of various programs for economic cooperation among developing countries and within the framework of the "Group of 77" and the nonaligned movement. Finally, at the global level it is possible to single out primarily the coordination and approval within the framework of the United Nations of the basic documents on the new international economic order (declaration and program of actions), as well as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the decision of the seventh special session of the UN General Assembly on problems of development and international economic cooperation. There are also certain positive results in some other directions in the reorganization of international economic relations.

However, the optimistic moods of the middle of the 1970's gradually give way to disappointment. The point also is that the adopted decisions on the integrated raw material program and the common fund (for example, on the fund's size and procedure of functioning) are very remote from the initial outlines of developing countries. The negotiations on the elaboration of the code of behavior in technological transfer have also reached a deadlock. The problem of protectionism in Western countries has not found its solution. Progress in the realization of the proposals on currency and financial problems, as well as in the coordination of the code of behavior for transnational corporations, has been very slight. The central proposal by developing states--to convene global negotiations--encounters a flat rejection by the West. In the opinion of Latin American countries, the sixth session of the UNCTAD ended in failure.

As a result, the decade of the fight for the new international economic order has not brought practically visible results in the economic situation of developing states. At the same time, it is quite obvious that the West, utilizing the contradictions among developing countries, disintegrated the program for the new international economic order to a significant degree. It took the negotiations outside the United Nations, placing them within the framework of the north-south dialogue.

The absence in Latin America and in the third world as a whole of adequate economic levers for the reorganization of international economic relations is an important objective reason for their failure in the realization of the program for the new international economic order. Although the positions of the region and of other developing countries in the world economy and trade have been strengthened, which gives certain grounds for speaking of a "new mutual dependence," the general balance of power has not undergone decisive changes.

Evidently, after some time elapses--from the moment of active inclusion of Latin American countries in the fight for the new international economic order--it is also possible to speak of the unrealistic nature of a number of formulations of this program. They include the very attempt to establish the new international economic order primarily, if not exclusively, by means of negotiations. Nor should the fact that, in addition to member countries, other interested "parties," including transnational corporations, also have an indirect and sometimes even a direct effect on the process of multilateral negotiations, be forgotten.

In turn, secretariats of international economic organizations do not remain aloof from attempts to expand multilateral negotiation activity and to establish new forums and organizations.

The preservation, despite existing political and economic differences, of the unity of developing countries both at the regional level, including in Latin America, and as a whole is the most important in multilateral economic negotiations. As the results of the First Latin American Economic Conference show, this unity continues to remain in the region one of the most influential tools of reorganization of international economic relations.

At the same time, a real reorganization of these relations will be attained not only and not so much at the negotiation table, but as a result of purposeful economic policy. Evidently, international negotiations can perform additional, although important, functions in this respect, which to a significant extent necessitates a fight for an improvement in the very negotiation mechanism of the world community and an intensification in the diversification of foreign economic relations of Latin American countries.

FOOTNOTES

2. "Exposición del señor Antonio Ortiz Mena, presidente del Banco Interamericano del Desarrollo ante el sexto período de sesiones de la UNCTAD," Belgrado, 17 de junio de 1983, p 4.
3. "Doc. E/CEPAL/G. 1160. The External Economic Relations of Latin America in 1980's," 23 April 1981, 144.
4. "Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics. 1983," New York, 1983, p 116.
5. During the 1970's the volume of direct private capital investments in the region was doubled and exceeded 50 billion dollars. Calculated according to "Doc. UN/CTC/14 Salient Features and Trends in Foreign Direct Investment," 1983, pp 59 and 60.
6. "Cuadernos de la CEPAL, Santiago de Chile, 1981, N 40, p 5.
7. Ibid, p 4.
8. "Discurso del Secretario Ejecutivo de la CEPAL, señor Enrique V. Iglesias, en el sexto período de sesiones de UNCTAD," Belgrado, junio de 1983, p 6.
9. GRANMA. La Habana, 27.XII.1983; 27.I.1984; "Notas sobre la economía y el desarrollo de América Latina," 1983, N 373, p 12. In particular, the inflation level, which during the 1975-1980 period averaged 36 percent annually, rose to 63 percent in 1981 and to 80 percent in 1982, reaching the 130 percent line in 1983. Doc. UNCTAD/TDR/3 (part. 1). "The Trade and Development Report 1983," p 36; GRANMA, 27.XII.1983.

10. DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE, Budapest, 1983, Vol 4, N 1, p 86.
11. For example, the LAES mandate determines that promotion of intraregional cooperation for the purpose of acceleration of the economic and social development of member countries is one of its central tasks (article 3 of the Panama Convention). In ECLA activity the accomplishment of this task is also one of the most important directions. Regional associations of producers--the Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UPEB), the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Sugar Exporting Countries (GEPLACEA) and regional sectorial associations of the type of the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE)--are largely oriented toward the development of mutual cooperation.
17. The following were used as the basic documents for singling out the elements in the positions of Latin America: "Programa de Acción Regional para América Latina en los Años Ochenta," resolución 422 (XIX) de la CEPAL; "Manila. Arucha. Caracas" SELA Set Informativo 6, 1979; "Final Report of the Preparatory Meeting of Latin American Coordination Prior to UNCTAD VI," February 25 1983; "Comunicado de Managua," enero de 1983; "Declaración de Quito," enero de 1984; Resolution of sessions of the Latin American Council.
18. The proposal on convening so-called global negotiations with the participation of all states on problems of raw materials, energy, trade and development and on currency and financial problems was made at the sixth conference of nonaligned countries in Havana (1979). This proposal received the support of the international community (resolution 34/138 of the UN General Assembly). However, the position of the United States and some other Western countries does not make it possible to begin global negotiations despite the wish of the overwhelming majority of UN members.
19. The Integrated Raw Material Program was adopted at the UNCTAD-IV (Nairobi, 1976). As its main goals it envisaged the stabilization of trade in raw material goods and of the export proceeds of developing countries, diversification of production and so forth. The realization of the integrated raw material program should be ensured by the conclusion of intergovernment agreements on individual raw material goods, as well as by the establishment of a common fund for financing measures for the stabilization of markets of raw material goods. The agreement on the common fund was attained in 1980. To this day, however, it has not entered into force, because a significant number of countries have not yet signed or ratified it.
20. Multilateral trade negotiations of the Tokyo Round were held in 1973-1979 within the framework of the GATT with the participation of 99 countries and ended with the adoption of a number of coordinated codes on the regulation of international trade and reduction of tariff and nontariff barriers. Most developing, including Latin American, countries expressed dissatisfaction with the results of multilateral trade negotiations.
21. The decision on the introduction of nonmutual and nondiscriminatory trade preferences adopted within the framework of the UNCTAD is aimed at improving the access of goods, mainly finished and semifinished products, exported by developing countries to the markets of developed countries. The schemes of the general system of preferences adopted by Western countries do not satisfy developing states and are subjected to serious criticism by them.

22. GRANMA, 18.I.1984.
23. UNCTAD, "Conference Resolution 152 (VI)."
24. See: MEIMO, 1983, No 10, p 87.
25. C. Alzamora T. and E. V. Iglesias, "Bases para una respuesta de América Latina a la crisis económica internacional."
26. GRANMA, 2.V; 3.VIII.1983.
27. GRANMA, 18.I.1984.
28. A critical evaluation of these positions is given in the following works:
E. Ye. Obminskiy, "'Gruppa 77.' Mnogostoronnaya ekonomicheskaya diplomatiya razvivayushchikhsya stran" /"Group 77." Multilateral Economic Diplomacy of Developing Countries/, Moscow, 1981; VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, No 10, 1983, pp 2-7; MEIMO, 1983, No 10, pp 78-73.

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Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 84 pp 87-92

/Interview with Rene Theodore, general secretary of the Central Committee of the United Haitian Communist Party, by LATINSKAYA AMERIKA correspondent: "Haiti: Consolidation of All Democratic Forces Is the Chief Thing"; date and place not specified/

/Excerpt/ Our correspondent met with Rene Theodore, general secretary of the Central Committee of the United Haitian Communist Party, and asked him to discuss Haiti's social and economic situation and the struggle of progressive forces, primarily communists, against Duvalier's dictatorship and for the interests of the popular masses.

/Question/ What is the alternative put forward by democratic forces?

/Answer/ Our party considers the Duvalier regime an autocracy, that is, personal, lifetime presidency established 27 years ago. The struggle against it unites (so to speak, de facto) essentially all the opposition forces. However, some (legalists) are in favor of holding elections to the parliament and local bodies, assuming that on the basis of legality supported, in their opinion, by the government it is possible to find a way "from within" the system and to overcome autocracy. Others consider these hopes totally unfeasible and masking the essence of the present repressive system. There are also differences of opinion on the problem of the use of elections in the political struggle.

In an attempt to create a coalition of forces, which could head the struggle against Duvalier, the communist party did a great deal so that various opposition circles may not only proclaim the need for unity, but also take some steps to coordinate political actions. However, disagreements also exist today. They are based on another approach to the problem on the part of legalists, in particular Christian democrats and social Christians, who do not reject a dialogue with Duvalier. This dialogue has not yet been held and is hardly possible at all, because the government sees a deadly enemy in every member of the opposition.

There are also other differences of opinion. The leadership of some parties assumes that, taking into consideration the special interest of the United States in the region of the Caribbean Sea, communists, even if they should

participate in the democratic front, should take second roles, giving leadership to those that can become a force "acceptable" for the United States. For example, leaders of the National Progressive-Democratic Assembly think so. We, Haitian communists, came out (and come out) in favor of the adoption of any political decisions in Haiti in accordance with national interests. We do not need to fear what foreign powers, in particular the United States, will "think." The United States more than once trampled upon the country's sovereignty, intervening in our internal affairs. The result of this is on hand: indigence, poverty and emigration--everything that was discussed earlier. Therefore, now, when political discussions with various forces are beginning--and we are supporters of these discussions leading to a coordination of positions--communists insist only on an equality of rights and duties--let life itself, the support of the popular masses, give priority to one force or another.

Our party has done a great deal in this direction and the results are already felt. Both Social Christians and Christian Democrats are brought closer together. We connect the beginning of the new phase in the struggle against the dictatorship with the existing prospects for the consolidation of opposition forces. We impose our program on no one, but only develop guidelines for ourselves and are ready to listen to all the rest.

First of all, it is necessary to guarantee national sovereignty. This is the most important point for us. There are already talks about the establishment of American military bases in our zone, in particular in Haiti. Almost all the country's political forces are against this. National sovereignty also has economic aspects. They must be taken into consideration. Next, an end must be put to lifetime presidency. The problem of democratic liberties for us is not reduced to overthrowing Duvalier and to saying goodbye to autocracy. We raise the problem of democratization of public life. After all, Duvalism means not only lifetime presidency, but also an attack on political parties and trade unions and workers' deprivation of the right to defend their interests...

On the basis of the three points of the struggle--national sovereignty, Duvalier's overthrow and democratization of public life--we see the possibility of uniting all democratic forces.

/Question/ What internal problems face the United Haitian Communist Party?

/Answer/ Having an internal unity, our party has become the initiator and inspirer of the struggle for the unity of all democratic forces. However, why has this task not been accomplished? What should be done to accomplish it? These are the problems confronting us now. These are the problems that evoke arguments among communists. What path should be followed? Should we concentrate our efforts exclusively on strengthening the party itself, expecting that the unity of democratic forces is formed by itself, or does it depend on the will of many?

The supporters of the second point of view believe that strengthening the party is a constant task--there are no and can be no limits here. However, the problem of unity is solved at the level of the masses, not by leaders. The more

actively communists explain their line and the more actively they conduct themselves in daily clashes with the authorities, the more strength the party will accumulate and the more rapidly it will enlist the sympathies of the masses. The majority in the United Haitian Communist Party holds this second point of view, believing that it is necessary to stimulate the establishment of the democratic front. Certain advances have already been attained along this path.

There are also other kinds of difficulties. As I noted, the majority of the working class is concentrated at "maquiladoras." The political work, which we conduct at these enterprises, is "materialized" with difficulty. At other factories, where the composition of workers is more or less permanent, results are attained. Now we face the task of finding organizational forms that would make it possible to establish close relations with all categories of workers. This is very complex, but, evidently, possible.

Terror is another objective factor hampering our activity. Any action by the people is immediately declared as "inspired" by communists and so forth. This, of course, does not contribute to the enlistment of people in our ranks, despite the tremendous sympathy manifested for us in the most different situations.

In the last few years emigration has gained greatly in scope. The party has made the appeal: "To remain in the country," "to be here!" However, the process is continuing.

Our party not only makes big efforts so that members of the United Haitian Communist Party remain in the country, but also develops measures so that those that, nevertheless, leave Haiti could continue the struggle against Duvalier. Emigration is a negative tendency for the country as a whole. After all, the best, the most skilled workers, as well as peasants, leave! The entire family gathers and chooses: Who will leave? The most competent, the most persistent and stubborn, who will be able not only to survive, but also to help those that remain. A distinctive selection takes place. That is why we so fight against emigration and carry out work among those that have left.

In the atmosphere of crisis among the youth and the intelligentsia concerned by the country's fates many groups, which identify themselves with communists, appear. Naturally, we are not in favor of immediately admitting them to the party. We have admission criteria. But this is a symptomatic fact. It points to the influence of the party and its ideas in the country.

The opponent delivers perceptible blows at us. We realize that it is necessary to improve the communication system and to see to it that personnel are retained. Our influence must be extended to all the country's regions.

/Question/ What role does the concept of negritude play in public life?

/Answer/ Anticommunism of the purest water serves as the theoretical platform of the present regime. With regard to negritude, it served its time and was dumped. Pronounced class concepts and at times with a fascist inclination are now embodied ever more openly.

/Question/ How is the aggravation of the situation in the Caribbean Basin reflected in the internal political situation?

/Answer/ Despite the fact that the Duvalier Government is pro-American supporting all U.S. resolutions in the United Nations and in the Organization of American States, it was forced to react slightly differently in connection with the events in Grenada. Haitian and Dominican presidents kept silent, but ministries of foreign affairs spoke about territorial inviolability, sovereignty, nonintervention and so forth. This is of great importance for us.

The point is that the subject of Haiti's territorial integrity is quite "hot." The question of granting the territory to the United States for a military base was intensively debated not long ago. That is why even the Duvalier Government was forced to react in such a form.

The Haitian bourgeoisie ardently supported U.S. intervention in Grenada. It has seemingly received confirmation of the fact that it does not count in vain on American help in case of more or less radical changes inside the country.

However, the majority of the population believes that the invasion of Grenada has shown the reality of the threat for the nations of the entire region. The feeling of protest against Reagan's adventures in the Caribbean Basin is growing in the country.

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INTERNATIONAL

ARMY 'DEMOCRATIC CIRCLES' ROLE IN COLOMBIAN POLITICS

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 84 pp 95-103

[Article by S. A. Baburkin: "Armed Forces in Colombia's Political System"]

[Excerpts] Colombia's armed forces, which for more than one-fourth of the century have not held power directly, play an important role in the country's social and political life, being an example of the army's active intervention in politics under the conditions of a system preserving the basic attributes of bourgeois representative democracy. The range of evaluations of their role is as wide as the spectrum of the country's social and political forces. It includes both an unconditional approval and an active encouragement of the rise in the political influence of the armed forces on the part of extreme reaction, praise for their services in the cause of "saving democracy" against the onset of "totalitarian communism," grumble by bourgeois liberals considering the intensification of the political activity of the military an anomaly in the functioning of the system of representative democracy and believing that the army's place is in barracks so long as social and political tension does not reach its limit, a critical, but differentiated, approach by progressive circles systematically coming out in favor of genuine democratization of the armed forces and sharp attacks by ultraleftists, who groundlessly identify all the military with reaction, endow the army with some democratic features and direct the entire pathos of vulgar antimilitarism against it. In order to understand the role and place of the armed forces in the country's political system, we will examine in accordance with the principles of the Marxist concrete historical analysis the characteristics of their rise and basic historical stages and trace the evolution of their political role in the context of development of Colombian society.

The establishment in August 1958 of the coalitional bipartisan regime of the National Front based on an absolute parity of liberals and conservatives in legislative, executive and judicial authorities marked the beginning of a new stage in the development of Colombia's political system and in the evolution of the social and political role of its armed forces.

In the early 1960's the new military policy of the United States in Latin America conducted in connection with the proclamation by the American Administration of the program "Alliance for Progress" had a significant effect on the Colombian army. It was characterized by the replacement of the doctrine of "non-continental aggression" by the concepts of the "internal front" and "antipartisan war" and by a shift in emphasis to the "stabilizing" and "modernizing" functions of the armed forces.¹⁰

However, the ideology and political positions of the Colombian military during that period were determined not only by the influence of the United States. The views and activity of Gen Alberto Ruis Novoa, who held the post of minister of defense in 1962-1965, had a big impact on it. Ruis Novoa's concept with all its nonconclusiveness and presence of diverse elements, on the whole, was of a developmental antioligarchic nature.

Ruis Novoa stressed the need to use the "Alliance for Progress" program for the solution of problems facing the country. He counted on the real contribution of the armed forces to the country's social and economic development. In Ruis Novoa's opinion, a simple construction of roads and schools in remote regions, the army's medical aid for the population and similar measures could not ensure "true social justice," in which he saw the "national goal." Believing that "the advance of communism can be hindered" only through the implementation of "structural reforms," in particular agrarian, tax and political reforms, Ruis Novoa connected their realization with the army's constitutional mission consisting in the support of public institutions and in the defense of national sovereignty."¹¹

Under Ruis Novoa an active discussion of social-economic and political problems began in military circles and the armed forces began to hold an independent critical position with respect to the regime of the National Front. Such processes in the armed forces evoked concern on the part of the ruling clique. Accusing Ruis Novoa of the preparation of a "military coup d'etat of a leftist trend" and taking refuge in the thesis on the "army's intervention in politics," the ruling classes forced the dangerous general to retire, which weakened the position of progressively minded circles in the army and contributed to the strengthening of the positions of reactionary officers.

Nevertheless, after Ruis Novoa's resignation progressive and even radical trends continued to exist and develop in the army, which, in particular, was indicated by the publication and dissemination in various garrisons of the bulletin ZOLO-TAYA ZVEZDA, the "organ of patriotic and antiimperialist circles of the armed forces," which came out in favor of profound social reforms, including a "decisive overthrow of the exploiters by the exploited and the creation of a new society."¹²

Having removed the military from direct state management and having again subordinated the army to civil authorities, the National Front did not exclude it from social and economic life and did not banish it from politics. Playing under the conditions of the parity system the role of its main support, the armed forces preserved and even increased their influence on the country's political life. Waging the struggle against the partisan movement gathering strength in rural regions, suppressing mass actions in cities, performing judicial functions under the conditions of a state of siege, which was more than once introduced during those years, participating in programs for the development of remote regions difficult of access and heading government bodies in charge of problems of social and economic development, in the expression of the Colombian sociologist Gonzalo Bermudez Rossi, the military underwent a distinctive "school of power."¹³

The dismantling in 1974 of the parity system and return to former rules of political struggle gave a new impetus to the rise in the role of the armed forces. Under the conditions of the deepening structural crisis and the intensification of state-monopolistic tendencies in the economy and of the crisis of traditional political parties the ruling classes embarked on the path of restricting social and political liberties and of directly leaning on the army. A state of siege was in effect during almost 3 years out of the 4-year period of rule of President Alfonso Lopez Michelson (1974-1978).¹⁴ The influence of the military extended to all the new spheres of public life. President Lopez Michelson admitted this openly, justifying the rise in the army's role by the complication and aggravation of social problems.¹⁵

The expansion of the functions of the armed forces contributed to a rise in their political role and, at the same time, had a significant effect on processes occurring in the army itself. Important changes took place in the Colombian military and political doctrine. In addition to particularly military aspects it encompassed all the new social-economic and political ones. The concepts of "national defense" were replaced by the "doctrine of national security," which was transformed into the doctrine of "national construction" claiming the role of state ideology.

Disagreements in connection with the interpretation of the constitutional mission of the armed forces and their role in society intensified in the officers' corps in the middle of the 1970's. The advocates of the "rigid line," whose views were developed under the effect of the Brazilian version of the doctrine of "national security," on the basis of an arbitrary combination and broad interpretation of articles 165 and 166 of the constitution sought to substantiate the responsibility of the armed forces not only for the country's defense against foreign aggression, but also for the maintenance of "internal security." They postulated the equivalence and interconnection of these tasks and stressed that the duty of the armed forces was to direct their efforts against any threat of national security regardless of its source and nature if civil institutions, which were also responsible for ensuring national security, were unable to oppose this threat.¹⁶ The meaning of such arguments lay in ideological support for the army's advancement to key positions in the system of state bodies and public institutions and in the justification of the intensified intervention of the military in politics.

The democratic circles of officers, leaning on the traditions of patriotism and professionalism, contrasted this line with another interpretation of the army's role in society. Considering the safeguarding of the homeland's territorial integrity and independence the army's most important constitutional task, they also came out in favor of expanding the functions of the armed forces and intensifying the role of the military in society, but stressed that this role should be auxiliary and constructive. Pointing out the long-established traditions of the participation of the military in the solution of problems concerning the country's economic development, the advocates of this line stressed that such a practice should continue and acquire an ever more diverse nature. At the same time, they warned against enthusiasm for "unsubstantiated concepts" presupposing the intervention of the military in affairs not pertaining to its competence in detriment to its basic functions.¹⁷

The ideological contradictions that began to appear in the armed forces were deadened by the ruling clique through personnel changes in the structure of the higher command. The resignation of Gen Alvaro Valencia Tovar and Gen Gabriel Puyana Garcia, who with their views instilled some anxiety in the ruling classes, a resignation provoked by the ruling clique, as in the case with A. Ruis Novoa, opened the way for the advancement of the reactionary military headed by Gen Luis Carlos Camacho Leyva. Toward the end of A. Lopez Michelson's administration they occupied key positions in the army. In their interpretation the doctrine of "national security" acquired an even greater anti-communist direction and reactionary nature than before and was characterized by the shifting of emphasis from modernizing to repressive elements. The activation of the struggle against "subversive activity," introduction of stricter legal norms and intensification of the repressive apparatus were put forward as the basic means of ensuring "national security."

At the end of 1977 after a general national strike the military clique sent a message to the republic's president, in which, referring to the increase in crime and violence in the country, as well as to the "slander campaign" allegedly developed by "subversive elements" against the armed forces, it demanded the adoption of extraordinary measures to maintain "internal security." The message stressed that in the implementation of these measures a special role should be assigned to the army as the "healthiest and most effective institution."¹⁸ This demarche was considered by the country's public an act of open pressure on the government and an attempt to legalize the army's intervention in state administration.

The features of the crisis of bourgeois democracy in Colombia became increasingly clearer during the period of Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala's presidency (1978-1982). Such shifts in the political system as a marked intensification of executive power with a simultaneous weakening of the effect of legislative bodies were accompanied by the spread of the reactionary ideology of "national security" even in civil circles and by the further rise in the role of the armed forces in the country's social and political life.¹⁹ In the armed forces themselves with the appointment of Gen Camacho Leyva to the post of minister of defense the positions of reactionary circles were strengthened even more. Extreme putsch aspects were manifested more and more clearly in the moods of these reactionary circles.

During that period in the country's vast zones encompassing whole departments the military essentially had full power. The sphere of application of military justice continued to expand. Military intelligence and counterintelligence bodies, which pushed their civil partner--the Security Administration--to the background, increased their activity inside the country. The military initiated an extensive anticommunist campaign.

Along with the maintenance of a state of siege the adoption of a number of legislative acts, primarily of the so-called "security statute" introduced by the presidential decree No 1923 dated 6 September 1978, contributed in large measure to all this.²⁰ The content of this statute fully met the demand formulated on behalf of the armed forces on the adoption of "additional measures" for the maintenance of "internal security" and created a legal basis for the expansion

of the army's intervention in politics. Soon after the adoption of this "statute" the journal ALTERNATIVA noted the following: "On the pretext of fighting against subversive activity and narcotics, as well as safeguarding security, the country is rapidly placed under the direct control of the military."²¹

Acquiring an ever greater weight in internal political life, the military also began to have a marked effect on the formation of the country's foreign political course. Under its influence, referring to the "proofs of Cuban intervention" in Colombia's internal affairs fabricated by it jointly with the Pentagon, in March 1981 the government broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba. Under the pressure of the military President J. C. Turbay Ayala postponed his visit to the USSR and the People's Republic of China, which did not take place subsequently. Its position was reflected in the government's decision to offer an infantry battalion as part of so-called "international forces for the maintenance of peace in Sinai" formed by the United States and in Colombia's other actions at the international arena.

All this indicated that the ruling circles consciously pursued the formation of a system of so-called "limited democracy"--a distinctive symbiosis of authoritarianism and representative democracy, whose key elements were the armed forces. However, the intensification of reactionary tendencies encountered resistance on the part of Colombia's progressive forces, which came out in favor of the preservation of democratic institutions and extension of the people's political rights. The Colombian Communist Party was in the vanguard of this struggle. Approaching the military in a differentiated manner and singling out various, including progressive, trends in the army, communists resolutely opposed the militarization of public life, appealed to all democratic forces for unity and high vigilance in order to prevent the implementation of putsch plans by the most reactionary circles of the supreme command, exposed the crimes of the military clique against the local population in rural regions and the provocations of special army services against progressive forces in cities and protested against the tortures of political prisoners and the arbitrary rule of military justice, making every effort to stop the country's slide to military dictatorship.

At the same time, the intensification of the army's intervention in state affairs and, what was most important, the striving by its extreme wing to exceed the limits of the necessary and permissible (from the point of view of the ruling classes) evoked concern in their moderate circles. The efforts of these circles, leaning on the army for the maintenance of their class rule, were directed toward keeping it under control and preventing the establishment of an open military dictatorship undesirable for the Colombian bourgeoisie under those conditions.

The accession of Belisario Betancur Cuartas to power as a result of the presidential elections of 1982 marked the intensification of the positions of this sector of Colombia's ruling classes. The attempt by the new president to turn the development of the country's political system from the sliding path of "limited democracy" widely leaning on armed violence, which was hardly concealed by representative institutions and institutes, to the track of "sound" bourgeois democracy capable of ensuring the interests of ruling classes and a relative political stability through the attainment of "national consent" presupposed an appropriate correction of the role and place of the armed forces in the political system.

It began with changes in the composition of the supreme military command. Instead of Gen Camacho Layva, who retired, Gen Fernando Landazabal Reyes was appointed to the post of minister of defense. With his numerous books, articles and speeches he created for himself the reputation of a military intellectual deeply concerned with the country's social and economic problems and recognizing the need for reforms. His first speech after his appointment to the highest military post fully corresponded to the reformist spirit of the policy proclaimed by Belisario Betancur. The program for the "renewal" of the armed forces promulgated by F. Landazabal Reyes envisaged their organizational and technical modernization and the transfer of the basic functions of ensuring internal order to the police.

The personality of the new minister of defense, like his program, evoked contradictory and even diametrically opposed evaluations. Some saw in him a "renovator," the closest to B. Betancur from the entire cabinet in his political views, received the proposed reform of the armed forces with approval and welcomed the "new style" of the head of the military department.²² On the other hand, to others it was "obvious that the line pursued by Landazabal opposes the democratization promised by President Betancur"²³ and the true goal of the renewal proclaimed by him was to switch public attention from the army to the police and, at the same time, to establish the military in the key positions occupied by them in the country's political system during the preceding period.²⁴

Noting the positive elements in the foreign and domestic policy of Belisario Betancur's government, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia held in February 1983 pointed out that the repressive apparatus was kept in full combat readiness, the attack against rural regions, where revolutionary traditions were strong or partisan detachments operated, continued under the cover of so-called "development operations" and the intervention of the military in the affairs of civil justice did not stop. Communists considered such phenomena "serious concessions to militarism and reaction" with good reason.²⁵

Thus, the army remains in the center of confrontation of various political forces concerning the problem of the ways of the country's further development, does not surrender the occupied positions and retains a powerful political potential.

An analysis of the evolution of Colombia's armed forces confirms the correctness of the well-known remark by Karl Marx that the "entire history of civilian society is summed up with a striking clarity in the history of the army."²⁶ In the course of more than half a century of Colombia's independent development its armed forces underwent significant changes, being transformed from semipartisan detachments, from a "praetorian guard" at the service of military caudillos into a modern army playing an important role in the country's political life. The increase in the political independence and activity of the armed forces brought about by the characteristics of Colombia's social and economic development and by the activity of the ruling classes, which consciously involve the army in politics, at times contradicts the direct interests of the ruling circles, which predetermines the ambiguous nature of their relations with the military. Although, on the whole, the army has performed the role of the defender and support of the ruling classes, it does not represent a reactionary

monolith. Progressive trends have often appeared and now exist in its ranks. The further development of Colombia's armed forces and the evolution of their role in the country's political system largely depend on their confrontation with reactionary forces in the army and on the struggle of democratic and reactionary circles in society.

FOOTNOTES

10. See: A. F. Shul'govskiy, "Armiya i politika v Latinskoy Amerike" [Army and Politics in Latin America], Moscow, 1979, pp 54-65.
11. A. Ruíz Novoa, "El gran desafío," Bogotá, 1965, pp 53-54, 77-82, 95 and 107.
12. See: A. Echeverría U., "El poder y los militares. Un análisis de los ejércitos del continente y Colombia," Bogotá, 1978, pp 108-109.
13. G. Bermudez Rossi, Op. cit., p 249.
14. G. Gallon Giraldo, "Quince años de estado de sitio en Colombia: 1958-1978," Bogotá, 1979, p 183.
15. EL TIEMPO, Bogotá, 24.VII.1977.
16. REVISTA DE LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS, 1976, N 84, pp 321-324.
17. Ibid, pp 327-328.
18. EL TIEMPO, 20.XII.1977.
19. "Documentos políticos," Bogotá, 1980, N 143, pp 18-19.
20. EL TIEMPO, 7.IX.1978.
21. ALTERNATIVA, Bogotá, 1978, N 187, p 4.
22. SEMANA, Bogotá, 1982, N 17, p 28.
23. VOZ PROLETARIA, Bogotá, 17.I.1983.
24. COLOMBIA, 1982, N 6, p 21.
25. "Resolución Política aprobada por el Pleno del Comité Central del Partido Comunista Colombiano, febrero de 1983," Punto de vista, S. I., s. a., N 1, p 20.
26. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 29, p 154.

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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK ALLEGES CIA TIES TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

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/Review by A. G. Gramotov of book "'Kondor' Ostavlyayet Sledy" /'Condor' Leaves Traces' by V. Mashkin, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, Moscow, 1983, 207 pages

/Text Speaking at the 26th CPSU Congress, Rodney Arismendi, first secretary of the Communist Party of Uruguay, in particular, stated the following: "Placing terrorism and the struggle for democracy and national liberation in the same rank, the United States tries to mask the true face of terrorism proper on the entire American continent with the help of the CIA, Pentagon or tyrannies obedient to it." One of the terrorist organizations in Latin America ("Condor"), which is at the service of North American imperialism, is discussed in the reviewed book.

As is noted in the introduction, "intervention in the internal affairs of the 'neighbors in the Western hemisphere,' plots and the organization of coups d'etat--these are the distinctive features of the activities of the United States south of its borders. Terrorism is an integral part of these activities... Political assassination has long become one of the tools of American foreign policy" (p 11). In what does the author see the reason for the appearance of the "Condor"? An espionage department of the United States, which "resorts to terrorist acts against 'undesirable' political figures, on the whole, prefers, where this is only possible, to 'pull the chestnuts out of the fire' with someone else's hands, operating through intermediaries, through dummy organizations or those under its control, which, in particular, secret services of Latin American repressive regimes and local terrorist gangs are" (p 14).

However, traces remain, including the traces of "Operation Condor," which became a "new stage in the use of these intermediaries, because the CIA succeeded in uniting a certain part of them into a single continental network. 'Condor' is a supranational terrorist organization, which shows with special clarity that international terrorism has been raised by U.S. imperialism to the rank of state policy" (p 15). The secret agreements that initiated "Operation Condor" were initially concluded--with CIA blessing--between special services of Chilean and some other South American dictatorships. The circle of participants gradually expanded through other military intelligence and secret police of countries in South and then in Central America .

The "Condor" organization was established in the middle of the 1970's. Its headquarters is located in the Chilean capital. The permanent staff of workers is not big. Embarking on the performance of a certain action, "Condor" sends agents to follow the projected victim and the execution is carried out by a "gang of assassins," which is "not on the permanent staff." In particular, members of Cuban counterrevolutionary groupings frequently appear in the role of hired assassins (pp 17-18).

It must be especially stressed that the "corporation of assassins" persecutes not only communists and leaders and activists of leftist parties. Any political, trade union, public or religious figure can become a victim if, from the point of view of Washington and Latin American reaction, he is capable of uniting around himself a sufficiently wide circle of opponents of antipopular regimes pleasing to the United States.

Pinochet's secret police occupies in this corporation the position of the chief assistant to American intelligence. It is not accidental that a Chilean--Carlos Prats, an antifascist general, who died at the hands of hired assassins in Buenos Aires in September 1974--was "Condor's" first victim. The second on "Condor's death list" was also a Chilean, Bernardo Leighton, one of the founders of the country's Christian Democratic Party, who miraculously survived after the attempt on his life in October 1975. Orlando Letelier, who held three ministerial posts consecutively in the National Unity Government and after the fascist coup d'etat emigrated to the United States, also became "Condor's" victim.

The book discusses the role of "Condor" in the killing of a number of Latin American patriots, including J. J. Torres, ex-president of Bolivia, in the explosion of a Cuban airplane in Barbados, which resulted in the death of 73 people, and in the abduction of Antonio Maydana, a leader of Paraguayan communists, in Buenos Aires and in his extradition to dictator Stressner.

Two secret letters by E. Gairy, former dictator of Grenada, from which it was evident that he maintained close relations with "Condor" for the purpose of assassinating Prime Minister M. Bishop, became known after the publication of V. Mashkin's book.

Terror and repressions will not help imperialism and its agents to stop the growing flow of the Latin American liberation movement. Using the words of Pedro Vuskovich, a prominent figure in the Chilean National Unity, "even more resolute, more numerous comrades take up the banner of the fallen. Every death of a Latin American fighter advances, not postpones, the final defeat of fascism."

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INTERNATIONAL

FINNISH CENTER PARTY OFFICIAL LAUDS TIES WITH CPSU

[Editorial Report] Moscow SEL' SKAYA ZHIZN' in Russian publishes on 19 August 1984, on page 3, a 1000-word article by S. Kaarianen, general secretary of the Center Party of Finland, entitled "Years of Friendly Relations." The article discusses the importance of the relations between the Center Party and the CPSU in overall Finnish-Soviet relations, and in particular stresses the role of former president Kekkonen.

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INTERNATIONAL

BRIEFS

COURSES FOR OVERSEAS TEACHERS--Courses to promote the qualifications of overseas Armenian school teachers began in Yerevan. They are organized by the Armenian SSR Education Ministry and the Armenian Committee for Cultural Relations With Compatriots Abroad. Around 60 Armenian teachers from France, England, Canada, Italy, FRG, Lebanon, Syria, Sweden, Cyprus, Greece, Australia, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait and the UAE will attend lectures for 1 month on modern pedagogy, psychology, Armenian language and literature, and other subjects. Speeches will be organized for them with the following themes: "Soviet Public Education and Professional Schools Reform," "The Armenian SSR in the Fraternal Family of the Soviet Peoples," "The Progress of Armenian Industry," "The Successes of the Republic's Science, Culture, and Public Education," and other subjects. [Summary] [GF291524 Yerevan SOVETAKAN AYASTAN in Armenian 12 Aug 84 p 2 GF]

BERLINGUER FAMILY IN LENINGRAD--Leningrad August 25 TASS--Enrico Berlinguer's widow Letizia, her son Marco, daughters Bianca and Laura, accompanied by members of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party Gilli Tedesco and Antonio Tato, are making a tour of the Soviet Union. They arrived in Leningrad from Moscow yesterday. Today, they familiarised themselves with the life of the city, its architectural and cultural places of interest. The guests were received at the Executive Committee of the City Soviet of People's Deputies. Boris Taukin, deputy chairman of the Executive Committee, told them about the city's history, about plans of its all-round economic and social development and about the structure of the City Soviet. [Excerpt] [LD251938 Moscow TASS in English 1837 GMT 25 Aug 84]

TRADE UNIONIST IN UZBEKISTAN--Brian Price, executive secretary of the international trade unions committee for peace and disarmament [name and title as heard], has arrived in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Brian Price visited Uzbekistan to acquaint himself with our republic. He has been received by the Uzbek Council of Trade Unions and has met the active members of the Committee for the Defense of Peace. During his familiarization tour of Uzbekistan, he visited a number of industrial factories and in Tashkent participated in a meeting against war. Brian Price is now acquainting himself with Samarkand and Bukhara. [Text] [GF220748 Tashkent International Service in Uzbek 1700 GMT 20 Aug 84 GF]

REGIONAL

ARMENIAN MVD MINISTER ON ECONOMIC CRIME

[Editorial Report] Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian on 25 August carries on page 2 a 2,100-word article by A.S. Shaginyan, the minister of internal affairs for the Armenian SSR. Shaginyan devotes most of this very general article to a discussion of the importance of socialist property, and the ways in which it should be handled. He cites several examples when officials have failed in these tasks, and either had property stolen from factories, or participated themselves in black-market activities. The author states that special attention should be given to the process of selecting cadres, as they are the firstline of defense against economic crimes. Shaginyan highlights the work of a few services which attempt to control theft, the DND (Voluntary People's Militia) and the BKhSS (the Struggle With Thefts of Socialist Property and Speculation). He concludes by noting that all party members and workers should continue with this crucial battle.

CSO: 3521/356

REGIONAL

AZERBAIJAN 2ND SECRETARY CHAIRS MEETING ON WORKPLACE SAFETY

[Editorial Report] Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 14 August 1984 carries on page 2 a 200-word item on a republic meeting on the questions of strengthening "precautionary and prophylactic work and industrial, transportation, communications, and construction projects. Local party officials and responsible managers and others attended the meeting chaired by V. N. Konovalov, second secretary of the Azerbaijan CP CC. Various ministers, including those from the petroleum industry and Ministry of Internal Affairs spoke at the meeting.

CSO: 1830/650

REGIONAL

USSR MINISTER OF RADIO INDUSTRY VISITS BAKU

[Editorial Report] Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 10 August 1984 carries on page 2 a 200-word item on the visit on 6-7 August of USSR Minister of the Radio Industry P. S. Pleshakov to Azerbaijan. He visited factories and construction projects in Baku and Kirovabad and met with managers, workers and specialists. A party-economic aktive of enterprises and organizations within the sector was held where tasks for the industry and measures for improving the technological level of production were discussed.

Also present at the meeting were G. N. Seydov, chairman of the AzSSR Council of Ministers; V. N. Konovalov, second secretary of the Azerbaijan CP CC; and S. B. Tatliyev, first deputy chairman of the AzSSR Council of Ministers.

CSO: 1830/650

REGIONAL

KIRGHIZ PARTY AKTIV ON UPBRINGING OF YOUTH

[Editorial Report] Frunze SOVETSAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian on 13 August carries on page 3 a 5,300-word account of the republic-level party aktiv held in Frunze on 11 August. The first secretary of the Kirghiz CP, T.U. Usubaliyev, opened the sessions and gave a key-note speech urging further care in the education of youth and the strengthening of their Komsomol upbringing. Amongst other speakers on the roster were Minister of Internal Affairs, D.A. Akmatov, and chairman of the CC of the Kirghiz DOSAAF, K. Usenbekov. In his speech, Akmatov remarked that criminal research had revealed that a majority of young criminals were reared in a home-atmosphere of drunkenness, coarseness, and family scandals. He noted that, "[We] do not utilize sufficiently the criminal and administrative law in relation to persons, who attract youngsters to criminal activity and drunkenness, weakly limit the activity of drunken parents, and utilize insufficiently that severe, but necessary measure, of deprivation of parental rights." On a different note, Usenbekov dwelled on the problems of the improvement of preparation of youth, and in particular young women, in specialities which have an applied-military significance.

CSO: 1830/659

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